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ARTICLES
"BAD JUROR" LISTS AND THE PROSECUTOR'S
DUTY TO DISCLOSE
Ira P. Robbins*
Prosecutors sometimes use what are known as "bad juror" lists to
exclude particular citizens from jury service. Not only does this practice
interfere with an open and fair jury-selection process, thus implicating a
defendant's right to be tried by a jury of his or her peers, but it also
violates potential jurors' rights to serve in this important capacity. But
who is on these lists? And is a prosecutor required to disclose the lists to
defense counsel? These questions have largely gone unnoticed by legal
analysts.
This Article addresses the prosecutor's duty to disclose bad-juror
lists. It reviews the federal Freedom of Information Act, a variety of
state open-records acts and their exemptions, the work-product doctrine,
the fundamental-fairness doctrine, and the discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges (particularly in death-penalty cases). The Article con-
cludes by advancing recommendations for overcoming disclosure
exemptions and preserving the integrity of jury selection in the face of
the continued use of bad-juror lists.
The judicial system in the United States is adversarial. Particularly
in criminal cases, when prosecutors, who already hold enormous power,
are permitted to put their thumbs on the scale of justice during jury se-
lection, the entire system suffers-the rights of potential jurors, the rights
of the defendant, the reliability of the outcome of the proceedings, and
the appearance of justice.
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"BAD JUROR" LISTS
INTRODUCTION
The use of "bad juror" lists by prosecutors is a problem that has
largely gone unnoticed by legal analysts. In a 2010 case, criminal de-
fense attorney William Ray of Fort Worth, Texas discovered that Tarrant
County prosecutors had compiled a so-called bad-juror list.' This partic-
ular list contained the names of twenty-one jurors whom the district at-
torney's office sought to blacklist from all criminal trials in that district. 2
The Tarrant County prosecutors reportedly update the list at the conclu-
sion of every criminal trial so that prosecutors can use the list to aid in
future jury selections.3 Although the Tarrant County prosecutors appear
to be using this list to strike jurors during the voir dire process, the prose-
cutors maintain that nothing on the list "'would rise to the level of im-
proper exclusion.' "4
Despite the prosecutors' assurances that preparing and maintaining
the list was constitutionally permissible, Ray petitioned Texas Attorney
General Greg Abbott to force the prosecutors to disclose the list to the
public.5 In response, the prosecutors contested the list's release, arguing
that the list constituted protected work-product because it reflected the
prosecutors' thought processes and had been prepared in anticipation of
litigation.6
Although the bad-juror-list phenomenon has not widely caught the
attention of legal experts, the problem is not unique to Texas. In fact,
whether jury records compiled by prosecutors are discoverable has been
litigated in several jurisdictions, with conflicting results.7 These lists
I See Gene Trainor, Criminal Defense Attorney Wants List of 'Bad Jurors' Disclosed to
Public, FOrr WORTH STAR-TI.ICRAM (July 12, 2010), http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/
07/11/2327705/criminal-defense-attorney-wants.htmi (noting that, in 2009, criminal defense
attorney William Ray was successful in filing a request with the state that ultimately resulted
in the Tarrant County prosecutors' disclosing a more general list of jurors and their voting
records).
2 See Editorial, Tension in the Tarrant County Criminal Court, Fowr WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, July 15, 2010, at A16 (arguing that there is value in making the list available to the
public because it would show whether prosecutors engaged in unconstitutional conduct in ad-
ding certain jurors' names to the list).
3 See id.
4 Id. But see People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446, 465 (Cal. 1981) (explaining that to
deny defendants access to jury dossiers to which prosecutors have access will give the prose-
cution a significant advantage in the voir dire process).
5 See Trainor, supra note I (reporting that the prosecution opposed the defense attor-
ney's motion based on the work-product doctrine and argued that attorneys should be able to
keep private their mental impressions and subjective thoughts).
6 Id.
7 Compare Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274, 280 (9th Cir. 1958) (holding that jury
dossiers do not necessarily violate a defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury), with United
States v. Kyle, 469 F.2d 547, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that considerations of general
fairness may compel disclosure of jury dossiers).
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vary greatly-some include only criminal records of potential jurors;8
others include informational interviews conducted by law-enforcement
officials; 9 others include prosecutors' personal knowledge regarding spe-
cific jurors' past voting history' 0-and courts have taken equally varied
approaches to the discoverability of these lists. Courts have often cited
certain doctrines and statutes in holding that these lists are either exempt
from disclosure or that they must be produced. Most commonly, courts
have referred to the work-product doctrine, the fundamental-fairness
doctrine, state open-records acts, and the federal Freedom of Information
Act." Although some courts have applied these statutory and doctrinal
precedents to deny public disclosure, exempting bad-juror lists is not
only contradictory to the legislative intent behind disclosure exemptions,
but it also risks violating a juror's constitutional right to serve.
Part I of this Article examines the relevant doctrinal and statutory
settings both in support of and in opposition to the disclosure of the bad-
juror lists. This overview considers the exemptions to disclosure pro-
vided by both federal and state open-records acts, the governing case law
on the work-product doctrine, and the variability in the application of the
fundamental-fairness doctrine. Part II analyzes how the legislative intent
behind the Freedom of Information Act provides a relevant background
against which the state open-records acts can be examined. Part II also
evaluates how the application of state open-records acts supports a con-
clusion that bad-juror lists do not fall under any disclosure exemptions.
Part III addresses the validity of the work-product and fundamental-fair-
ness arguments and the potential constitutional issues raised by prevent-
ing certain individuals from serving on juries. Finally, Part IV advances
recommendations for overcoming disclosure exemptions and preserving
the integrity of jury selection in the face of the continued use of bad-juror
lists.
I. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of Federal and State Open-Records Acts
Open-records acts, which emphasize openness in both state and fed-
eral law, ensure that information and documentation maintained by gov-
ernment agencies will be available to the public. These acts are
8 See Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 613 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
9 See Commonwealth v. Smith, 215 N.E.2d 897, 900-01 (Mass. 1966).
10 See People v. Terrell, No. A125183, 2010 WL 2625579, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30,
2010).
11 Compare Losavio v. Mayber, 496 P.2d 1032, 1033 (Colo. 1972) (entertaining the
prosecution's argument that the records were exempt from disclosure under the state's open-
records act), with Couser v. State, 383 A.2d 389, 396 (Md. 1978) (refusing to disclose the
prosecution's jury dossier to defense counsel because the defense had not made a sufficient
showing of undue prejudice to justify dispensing with the work-product doctrine).
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implicated in the prosecutorial use of bad-juror lists because law-en-
forcement officers often provide prosecutors with information about pro-
spective jurors, such as their criminal history. While many states strictly
enforce open-records acts in order to preserve public openness,12 every
open-records act includes exemptions, which prosecutors often cite to
avoid the disclosure of documents in the state's possession.
1. Federal Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)i 3 provides guidance re-
garding congressional intent behind the implementation of state open-
records acts. 14 Pursuant to FOIA, any federal agency that maintains a
system of records must disclose those records to any individual upon
request, unless the records are protected from disclosure by one of the
Act's nine exemptions.15
For nearly a decade prior to FOIA's enactment, agency officials,
lawmakers, and individuals representing public-interest groups debated
the sufficiency of the then-current statutory scheme providing for public
access to federal agency records.' 6 In contrast to the public-disclosure
section of the Administrative Procedure Act' 7 that existed at the time,
FOIA's purpose was to ensure that every record falling within the con-
fines of the Act and not explicitly exempted from disclosure be made
available for public inspection.18
Case law interpreting FOIA's application also suggests that Con-
gress intended that courts broadly construe the Act in favor of individual
access to information.19 In fact, the United States Supreme Court con-
12 See discussion infra Part I.A.2.
13 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
14 See 26A CHARuFS ALAN WRIGHT & KENNItrH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACIICE
AND PRocnoURE: EvInDNCE § 5683, at 219 (1992) (noting that many state open-records acts
are modeled after the federal Freedom of Information Act and stating that "their [state open-
records acts'] history often mirrors that of the F.O.I.A.-that is, with tremendous governmen-
tal hostility to the idea of public access to official records").
15 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
16 See 112 CONG. Ri'c. 13641 (1966) (statement of Rep. John Moss) (explaining the
numerous debates that led to the enactment of FOIA).
'7 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).
18 Compare EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (bemoaning that, prior to the enact-
ment of FOIA, the public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act fell "far
short" of the goals Congress intended for it to achieve), with 112 CONG. REC. 13641 (1966)
(statement of Rep. John Moss) ("We must remove every barrier to information about-and
understanding of-Government activities consistent with our security . . . ."), and Ill CONG.
Riic. 2797 (1965) (statement of Sen. Long) ("[O]ur purpose in introducing the [Freedom of
Information Act] is ... that a necessary corollary to the right of a democratic people to partici-
pate in governmental affairs is the right to acquire information.").
19 See OI'ICE OF INFO. PoLIcy, U.S. DEP'Tr ov Jusricn, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION Acr
Guioir: INTRODUCTION (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/introduc.htm ("'The
basic purpose of [the] FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a
2012]1 5
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tended that the only way to hold the government accountable for its ac-
tions, which is essential in a democracy, is for "information that sheds
light on an agency's performance" to be made available to the general
public. 20 Moreover, the Supreme Court has discussed at length the rea-
son for specifically replacing the public-disclosure section of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act with FOIA,2 1 noting that Congress found that the
original Act fell short of its goal of promoting openness, instead becom-
ing more of a "withholding statute than a disclosure statute." 2 2 There-
fore, Congress fashioned FOIA with the express purpose of instilling "'a
general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is ex-
empted under clearly delineated statutory language.' "2 3
In order to ensure that FOIA was not looked upon as a general
"withholding statute," Congress enacted nine explicit exemptions; if
agency information did not fall within one of these exemptions, it was
subject to broad disclosure. 2 4  These exemptions, however, are not
mandatory; an agency still has discretion to disclose information that
falls within any of these exemptions, further emphasizing Congress's
goal of broad disclosure. 25 Pursuant to § 552(b) of FOIA, public disclo-
sure is not required where the records are:
(1) specifically authorized under criteria established by
an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy . . . ; (2) related solely
democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the governors accountable
to the governed."') (quoting NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978)).
20 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 795-96
(1989).
21 See, e.g., Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-62 (1976); Mink, 410 U.S. at
79-80.
22 See Rose, 425 U.S. at 360.
23 See id. at 360-61 (quoting S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965)).
24 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006). Furthermore, in order to "pierce the veil of administra-
tive secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny," the Act provides that
nothing that falls within the purview of the Act should be withheld without a specifically
stated exemption. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 361 (quoting Rose v. Dep't of Air Force, 495 F.2d
261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974)). Congress included each clearly delineated exemption to shield cer-
tain types of information from unwarranted invasions of personal or professional privacy. See
5 U.S.C. § 552(b). Congress drafted these exemptions more carefully than the original exemp-
tions in the Administrative Procedure Act, however, to ensure a narrower, more specific reach.
See Rose, 425 U.S. at 363, 370-71 (discussing specifically Exemptions 2 and 6, which deal
with "internal personnel rules and practices" and "personnel and medical files and similar
files"; however, given the intent of broad disclosure, a narrow interpretation of the exemptions
follows).
25 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Discretionary Disclosure and Exemption 4, FOIA UmrnUAi,
Summer 1985, at 3, available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-updatesNolVI-3/page3.htm
(noting that federal agencies are allowed to exercise discretion under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act when determining "whether to invoke applicable FOIA exemptions" (citing Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) (holding that the nine FOIA exemptions are not
"mandatory bars to disclosure"))).
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to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency; (3) specifically exempted from disclosure by
statute . .. ; (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential; (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoran-
dums or letters . . .; (6) personnel and medical files . . .
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacy; (7) records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes ... ;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or
condition reports prepared by . . . an agency responsible
for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions;
or (9) geological and geophysical information and
data . .26
The only exemption that is relevant to bad-juror lists is Exemption
7. Not all "records or information compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses" are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information
Act.2 7 In fact, FOIA provides that these records are exempt from disclo-
sure only
to the extent that the production of such law enforcement
records or information (A) could reasonably be expected
to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would de-
prive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D)
could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a
confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign
agency or authority or any private institution which fur-
nished information on a confidential basis, and, in the
case of a record or information compiled by criminal law
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investi-
gation or by an agency conducting a lawful national se-
curity intelligence investigation, information furnished
by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques
and procedures for law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law en-
forcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclo-
sure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention
26 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
27 Id.
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of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endan-
ger the life or physical safety of any individual.28
FOIA does not, however, govern the disclosure of public records
that are compiled by state agencies rather than federal agencies. 29 Nev-
ertheless, because the legislative history accompanying state open-
records acts is sparse, and states typically model their open-records acts
after FOIA, the congressional intent behind the enactment of FOIA pro-
vides guidance regarding the scope and purpose of Exemption 7.30 In-
deed, state courts often cite the legislative history of FOIA exemptions
when interpreting their own open-records acts.3 '
2. State Open-Records Acts
State open-records acts differ drastically from one another in their
amenability to the disclosure of public records, particularly when those
records fit into the category of "law-enforcement records." Like FOIA,
most state open-records acts provide for an exception to public disclosure
where the public records are compiled for law-enforcement purposes. 32
While the conditions that must be satisfied for these exceptions to apply
often vary from state to state, 3 3 the statutes do not typically differ with
regard to what types of records constitute law-enforcement records. 3 4
28 Id.
29 See id. § 552(a).
30 See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
31 See, e.g., Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 564, 568 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000); Daily Gazette Co. v. W. Va. Dev. Office, 482 S.E.2d 180, 188 (W. Va. 1996).
32 See, e.g., CONN. GiEN. STiAr. § 1-210(b)(3) (2007) (exempting from disclosure
"[r]ecords of law enforcement agencies not otherwise available to the public which records
were compiled in connection with the detection or investigation of crime"); IDAHO CoEm ANN.
§ 9-335 (2010) (granting state agencies discretion regarding whether to disclose law-enforce-
ment and similar records).
33 Although both Connecticut's and Idaho's statutes exempt from disclosure records that
were compiled for law-enforcement purposes, Connecticut's statute is much more precise con-
cerning exactly what types of law-enforcement records do not warrant mandatory disclosure.
Compare CONN. GEN. STAr. § 1-210(b)(3) (2007) (providing that the government is not re-
quired to disclose law-enforcement records that constitute: (A) records that would endanger
informants or witnesses not otherwise identified; "(B) signed statements of witnesses; (C) in-
formation to be used in a prospective law enforcement action if prejudicial to such action; (D)
investigatory techniques not otherwise known to the general public"), with loAHo CooIn ANN.
§ 9-335 (2010) (specifying that the government may choose not to disclose records compiled
for law-enforcement purposes when those records "(a) Interfere with enforcement proceedings;
(b) [d]eprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication; (c) [c]onstitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; (d) [d]isclose the identity of a confidential source
... ; (e) [d]isclose investigative techniques and procedures; or (f) [e]ndanger the life or physi-
cal safety of law enforcement personnel").
34 See, e.g., IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 9-337 (2010) (providing that, for purposes of Idaho's
open-records act, "'[f]aw enforcement agency' means any state or local agency given law
enforcement powers or which has authority to investigate, enforce, prosecute, or punish viola-
tions of state or federal criminal statutes, ordinances, or regulations").
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This section of the Article considers a variety of these state statutes-
from Texas, Georgia, Alabama, and Colorado-addressing their similari-
ties and especially their nuanced differences.
a) Texas's Open Records Act
The general policy statement contained in the Texas Open Records
Act indicates that the Act was not only meant to be broadly construed in
favor of granting individuals' requests for information,35 but also that it
was enacted to ensure that individuals have "complete" access to infor-
mation regarding governmental affairs. 36 Despite this initial statement,
the exceptions to disclosure contained in Texas's Open Records Act are
fairly comprehensive and are often broadly construed.37 Pursuant to this
Act, "an internal record or notation of a law enforcement agency or pros-
ecutor that is maintained for internal use in matters relating to law en-
forcement or prosecution is exempted from the requirements of [Texas's
Open Records Act]" in the following situations:
(1) release of the internal record or notation would inter-
fere with law enforcement or prosecution; (2) the inter-
nal record or notation relates to law enforcement only in
relation to an investigation that did not result in convic-
tion or deferred adjudication; or (3) the internal record or
notation: (A) is prepared by an attorney representing the
state in anticipation of or in the course of preparing for
criminal litigation; or (B) reflects the mental impressions
or legal reasoning of an attorney representing the state.3 8
The statute also provides that the exceptions do not apply to "basic infor-
mation about an arrested person, an arrest, or a crime."39
The recent litigation over the Tarrant County prosecutors' bad-juror
list provides insight into how this statute is used to prevent government
records from being disclosed.40  After discovering that the Tarrant
County prosecutors kept a bad-juror list, defense attorney William Ray
35 See Tex. Gov'T Coin ANN. § 552.001(b) (West 2004) ("This chapter shall be liber-
ally construed in favor of granting a request for information.").
36 See id. § 552.001(a) (explaining that "it is the policy of this state that each person is
entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, at all times to complete information
about the affairs of government and the official acts of public officials and employees").
37 See id. § 552.108(b).
38 Id.
39 Id. § 552.108(c).
40 See Gene Trainor, Tarrant 'Bad-Juror List' Can be Kept Private, Texas Attorney Gen-
eral Says, Fowr WORTH STAR-TEILEGRAM (Oct. 23, 2010), http:/www.star-telegram.com/
2010/10/25/2569909/tarrant-bad-juror-list-can-be.html.
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moved for disclosure of the prosecutors' list.4 I Texas Assistant Attorney
General James Morris agreed with the Tarrant County District Attorney
that the document should be exempt from disclosure.42 In agreeing with
the District Attorney's Office that "the document contains prosecutors'
subjective impressions and is used in preparation for trials," Morris cited
a 1983 state open-records decision 4 3 in which former Texas Attorney
General Jim Mattox had refused to mandate disclosure of another district
attorney's office's bad-juror list on the ground that the list contained
"'subjective opinions and conclusions made by prosecutors regarding the
relative desirability from the State's viewpoint of having the affected ju-
ror on another case.'" Mattox held in this 1983 decision that allowing
public access to these subjective comments would "unduly interfere with
law enforcement and crime prevention," 4 5 and, as a result, the list was
exempt from disclosure under the Texas Open Records Act.4 6
In making this determination, the Attorney General Decision re-
ferred to a 1982 Open Records Act Decision in which Texas Attorney
General Mark White had refused to require the District Attorney's Office
for Bell and Lampasas Counties to disclose its records because to do so
would interfere with an ongoing federal investigation. 47 In that 1982 de-
cision, Attorney General White distinguished the case at hand from a
1980 Open Records Decision, 48 in which the police department had con-
cluded its investigation into the victims' deaths, thus mandating disclo-
sure of investigative records because they would not have unduly
interfered with effective law enforcement. 49 Although three Open
Records Decisions had relied on different provisions of Texas's Open
41 See id. (quoting Forth Worth criminal defense attorney William Ray stating that the
Attorney General's refusal to mandate disclosure of the list "'flies in the face of open govern-
ment and gives prosecutors an advantage'").
42 Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Ltr. Rul. 2010-13557 (Sept. 7, 2010), available at
https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/50abbottlorl/2010/pdf/or201013557.pdf; see
Trainor, supra note 40.
43 Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Decision No. 369 (Apr. 8, 1983), available at https://
www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/47mattox/ord/1983/pdf/ordl9830369.pdf.
44 See id. (citing section 3(a)(8) of Texas's Open Records Act in holding that "notations
which consist of prosecutors' subjective evaluations of former jurors are excepted from
disclosure").
45 See id. ("[D]isclosure of prosecutors' subjective comments about former jurors would
tend to indicate the state's possible strategy in future prosecutions and, in doing so, would
compromise the state's effectiveness in prosecuting criminal matters.").
46 Tox. Gov"r Comtn ANN. § 552.108(a) (West 2011).
47 See Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Decision No. 340 (Dec. 31, 1982), available at
https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/46white/ord/1982/pdf/ordl9820340.pdf (re-
fusing to require the District Attorney's Office to disclose its records because of the pendency
of the federal investigation).
48 Id. (citing Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Decision No. 252 (Sept. 16, 1980), availa-
ble at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/46white/ord/1980/pdf/ORD19800252.
pdf).
49 Id. (citing Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Decision No. 252).
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Records Act in exempting law-enforcement records from disclosure, that
all three opinions came out in favor of the prosecution during three dif-
ferent administrations suggests that the Attorney General's Office has
been reluctant to mandate disclosure of these lists.
b) Georgia's Open Records Act
Although Georgia's Open Records Act is not as comprehensive as
the Texas Open Records Act, the case law regarding Georgia's Act is
more fully developed. Georgia courts typically look to the seminal case
of Hardaway Co. v. Rives when determining whether information in the
prosecution's possession is exempt from disclosure under the Open
Records Act.50
In Hardaway, the Georgia Supreme Court conducted a step-by-step
Open Records Act analysis. Under this analysis, the first question courts
must answer is whether the records requested are an agency's "public
records." 5' If the court is convinced that counsel is requesting informa-
tion that meets this criterion, then the court determines whether the
records are protected from disclosure under section 50-18-72 of Geor-
gia's Open Records Act or any other statute. 5 2 This section, which lists
statutory exemptions to disclosure, provides that information need not be
made available to the public if it consists of:
records compiled for law enforcement or prosecution
purposes to the extent that production of such records
would disclose the identity of a confidential source, dis-
close confidential investigative or prosecution material
which would endanger the life or physical safety of any
person or persons, or disclose the existence of a confi-
dential surveillance or investigation, [or if it consists of]
[r]ecords of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory
agencies in any pending investigation or prosecution of
criminal or unlawful activity, other than initial police ar-
rest reports and initial incident reports; provided, how-
50 422 S.E.2d 854, 854-55 (Ga. 1992).
5i Id. at 856 (citing Napper v. Ga. Television Co., 356 S.E.2d 640, 643-44 (Ga. 1987)).
See also WAYNE M. PURoOM, GEORGIA CivIL DiscovERY § 2:4 (6th ed. 2011-12). To deter-
mine whether a record is sufficiently public to trigger the application of the Open Records Act,
courts look to section 50-18-70 of Georgia's Open Records Act, which provides:
[T]he term "public record" shall mean all documents, papers, letters, maps, books,
tapes, photographs, computer based or generated information, or similar material
prepared and maintained or received in the course of the operation of a public office
or agency. "Public record" shall also mean such items received or maintained by a
private person or entity on behalf of a public office or agency which are not other-
wise subject to protection from disclosure . ...
GA. CoDE ANN. § 50-18-70 (2009).
52 See Hardaway, 422 S.E.2d at 856.
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ever, that an investigation or prosecution shall no longer
be deemed to be pending when all direct litigation in-
volving said investigation and prosecution has become
final or otherwise terminated.53
If the records are not exempt under these criteria or pursuant to any other
statute, the next question is whether the records should be protected by
court order to protect an individual's privacy.54
Despite the variety of exceptions under this statute, the court in
Hardaway made clear that, in accordance with legislative intent, these
exceptions were to be construed narrowly.55 The Georgia Supreme
Court has stated that one of the purposes of the Act is to "foster confi-
dence in government through openness to the public." 5 6 Therefore, un-
less the language of the statute explicitly exempts a certain type of record
from disclosure, the record should be made available to the public. 5 7
c) Alabama's Open Records Act
Alabama's Open Records Act favors public disclosure even more
than Georgia's Act. Pursuant to the Alabama Act, "[e]very citizen has a
right to inspect and take a copy of any public writing of this state, except
as otherwise expressly provided by statute."5 8 The statute exempts cer-
tain types of information from disclosure, including "registration and cir-
culation records and information concerning the use of the public, public
school or college and university libraries of this state," as well as
records concerning security plans, procedures, assess-
ments, measures, or systems, and any other records relat-
ing to, or having an impact upon, the security or safety
of persons, structures, facilities, or other infrastructures,
the public disclosure of which could reasonably be ex-
53 GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-72 (Supp. 2011).
54 See Hardaway, 422 S.E.2d at 856; see also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga. v.
Atlanta Journal, 378 S.E.2d 305 (Ga. 1989); Napper, 356 S.E.2d at 644.
55 See Hardaway, 422 S.E.2d at 857 (explaining that Georgia's Open Records Act "'di-
rects a narrow construction of its exclusions, exempting "only that portion of a public record to
which an exclusion is directly applicable""') (quoting Bd. of Regents, 378 S.E.2d at 307); see
also Atlanta v. Corey Entm't, Inc., 604 S.E.2d 140, 142 (Ga. 2004) (emphasizing that Georgia
public policy "strongly favors open government" and, therefore, "'any purported statutory
exemption from disclosure under the Open Records Act must be narrowly construed'") (quot-
ing Hardaway, 422 S.E.2d at 857).
56 Corey Entm't, Inc., 604 S.E.2d at 142 (quoting Athens Observer, Inc. v. Anderson,
263 S.E.2d 128, 130 (Ga. 1980)).
57 See id. (stating that Georgia's Open Records Act assumes all public records are availa-
ble for disclosure in the first instance, and the records are exempted from disclosure only if
state or federal statute prohibits or specifically exempts the records); Hardaway, 422 S.E.2d at
857 ("[W]e conclude that any purported statutory exemption from disclosure under the Open
Records Act must be narrowly construed.").
58 ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (2001).
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pected to be detrimental to the public safety or welfare,
and records the disclosure of which would otherwise be
detrimental to the best interests of the public.59
Despite Alabama's broad language suggesting that a record should not be
discoverable if its disclosure would be adverse to the public interest,
there is one glaring omission from the statute that distinguishes it from
its Texas and Georgia counterparts: the Alabama Open Records Act does
not specifically exempt records and notations maintained by law-enforce-
ment agencies. 60
In recent decisions, the Alabama Supreme Court has discussed the
implications of the state's Open Records Act.6 ' For example, in Tennes-
see Valley Printing Co. v. Health Care Authority of Lauderdale County,
the court underscored the legislature's intent that the statute be construed
liberally and in favor of the public, among other things, by placing the
burden of proof on the party refusing disclosure. 6 2 Because of Ala-
bama's documented history of promoting openness, Alabama courts
strictly construe the exceptions to the Open Records Act to preserve the
legislative intent.63 In the criminal context, the Alabama Supreme Court,
in Allen v. Barksdale, confirmed not only that the Act should be con-
strued liberally, but also that the "statutory and judicially created excep-
tions generally protect an individual's privacy, the integrity of a criminal
investigation, public safety and security, or privileged information." 64
Thus, when determining whether records should be exempted from dis-
closure, the Alabama courts must balance the interest of the citizen-or
attorney-in having access to public records against the privacy of the
individuals attempting to block disclosure.65
59 Id.
60 See id.
61 See Tenn. Valley Printing Co. v. Health Care Auth. of Lauderdale Cnty., 61 So. 3d
1027 (Ala. 2010) (detailing the long history of Alabama's open-records policy, beginning with
its open meetings law enacted in 1915, which morphed into the Open Records Act, first en-
acted in 1923); Allen v. Barksdale, 32 So. 3d 1264, 1274 (Ala. 2009).
62 61 So. 3d at 1030 ("'[T]he party refusing disclosure shall have the burden of proving
that the writings or records sought are within an exception and warrant nondisclosure of
them.'") (quoting Chambers v. Birmingham News Co., 552 So. 2d 854, 856-57 (Ala. 1989)).
63 The court in Allen v. Barksdale stated the following:
Citizens are entitled to information regarding the affairs of their government. Ala-
bama's Open Records Act . . . represents a long history of openness. The Open
Records Act is remedial and should therefore be construed in favor of the public
.... The exceptions to the Open Records Act should be strictly construed, because
the purpose of the Open Records Act is to permit the examination of public writings
and records.
32 So. 3d at 1274.
64 Id.
65 See id. at 1268.
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d) Colorado's Open Records Act
The Colorado Supreme Court's decisions in Colorado Open
Records Act 6 6 cases suggest that the state departs somewhat from the
Texas, Georgia, and Alabama approaches in its interpretation of the
state's Act. The court emphasizes that whether a document falls within
the Open Records Act depends on the purpose that will be furthered by
classifying a document as a "public record."67 The Act defines a "public
record" as
all writings made, maintained, or kept by the state, any
agency, institution, a nonprofit corporation, . . . or politi-
cal subdivision of the state . . . and held by any local-
government-financed entity for use in the exercise of
functions required or authorized by law or administrative
rule or involving the receipt or expenditure of public
funds. 68
Some police files compiled in bad-juror lists fall within this description
of "public records," as the state requires law-enforcement officers to
maintain records of names on jury lists.69 The Act, however, contains an
exception for records of investigations or investigatory files "compiled
for any other law enforcement purpose .... ."70
In 1972 in Losavio v. Mayber, the Colorado Supreme Court found
that information collected by law-enforcement officers for use by prose-
cutors during the voir dire process did not fall within the law-enforce-
ment-purpose exception of the state's Open Records Act. 71 Therefore,
the information, once used by prosecutors outside the purpose of law
enforcement in compiling the lists, is no longer an "internal matter[ ]" for
purposes of the law-enforcement exception. 72
The holding in Losavio is consistent with later Colorado Open
Records Act cases, in which the courts have found that the legislature
intended that the Act be broadly construed and required that only explicit
66 In Colorado, the Open Records Act is also referred to as the "Public Records Law,"
but, for consistency, this Article refers to the law as an Open Records Act.
67 See Losavio v. Mayber, 496 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Colo. 1972) (en banc) ("A record may
be a public record for one purpose and not for another.") (citing Looby v. Lomenzo, 301
N.Y.S.2d 163 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969); MacEwan v. Holm, 359 P.2d 413 (Or. 1961)).
68 Coio. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-202(6)(a)(I) (West 2011).
69 See Losavio, 496 P.2d at 1033 (explaining that an administrative order requires the
chief of police to maintain the actual police files and records of individuals on jury lists).
70 Cot o. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-204(2)(a)(I) (West 2011).
71 See 496 P.2d at 1034.
72 See id. at 1034 (holding that, once records compiled by police are in the possession of
the prosecution, defense attorneys are entitled to obtain the same information pursuant to Colo-
rado Criminal Procedure Rule 16(c)).
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exemptions may shield a public record from discovery. 73 Because of this
preference toward openness, as in Alabama, the party claiming the ex-
emption carries the burden of proving that the public record falls within
one of the stated exceptions. 74 Although Colorado, like the other states
previously discussed, created its Open Records Act with the purpose of
promoting openness in government, the Colorado Supreme Court has ex-
pressly stated that privacy interests of individuals and public officials in
their individual capacities may weigh heavily in an analysis of whether a
record is "public" in the first place.75 Thus, the court has emphasized
both the importance of the stated definition of a public record in the
open-records analysis and the express exceptions to the Open Records
Act. 76
B. The Work-Product Doctrine
Just as prosecutors have relied on the exemption provisions in state
open-records acts to resist disclosure of documents, some (such as the
Tarrant County District Attorney's Office77) have also argued against
disclosure by claiming that jury dossiers consist of protected attorney
work-product. When determining whether jury dossiers consist of infor-
mation that is privileged pursuant to the work-product doctrine, the best
73 See Ritter v. Jones, 207 P.3d 954, 957 (Colo. App. 2009) ("The General Assembly has
declared that it is 'the public policy of this state that all public records shall be open for
inspection by any person at reasonable times, except as . . . provided by law.'") (quoting
Coio. Rvv. STN. § 24-72-201 (2001)); Black v. Sw. Water Conservation Dist., 74 P.3d 462,
467 (Colo. App. 2003).
74 See Black, 74 P.3d at 467; supra text accompanying note 62.
75 See Wick Commc'ns Co. v. Montrose Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 81 P.3d 360, 365
(Colo. 2003) (en banc) (holding that documents created by a public official in his or her pri-
vate capacity do not fall within the purview of the Colorado Open Records Act).
76 Like the Colorado Open Records Act, the California Open Records Act recognizes
that, while generally "access to information concerning the conduct of people's business is a
fundamental and necessary right of every person in th[e] state," there are several valid reasons
that certain records should not be made public. Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court, 141 P.3d
288, 293 (Cal. 2006) (citations omitted) (explaining that the Legislature expressly stated that it
was "mindful of the right of individuals to privacy") (internal quotation marks omitted);
Haynie v. Superior Court, 31 P.3d 760, 761 (Cal. 2001) (noting that the Act recognizes that
interests in "privacy, safety, and efficient governmental operation" support the many excep-
tions to the Open Records Act, listed in 26 subdivisions of the Act). Among the many statu-
tory exceptions, section 6254(f) of the California Open Records Act, which exempts certain
records of law-enforcement agencies from discovery, is broadly interpreted. See Williams v.
Superior Court, 852 P.2d 377, 384-87 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (thoroughly discussing the ex-
emption for law-enforcement documents and noting that the Act is derived from FOIA).
When considering the exceptions to the Open Records Act, California courts must balance the
public's right to open access to information, the government's interest in confidentiality, and
the individual's right to privacy. Copley Press, 141 P.3d at 293.
77 See Editorial, supra note 2 (noting that the prosecution opposed disclosure of the bad-
juror list on the ground that the work-product doctrine protects attorneys' mental impressions).
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source of guidance is the 1947 United States Supreme Court case, Hick-
man v. Taylor.7 8
In its discussion of the need to protect documents prepared by attor-
neys, the Hickman Court held the following:
[I]t is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree
of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing
parties and their counsel . . . . This work is reflected, of
course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, corre-
spondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs,
and countless other tangible and intangible ways . . . .
Were such materials open to opposing counsel . . . [t]he
effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing. 79
Under Hickman, information deemed to be work-product is not discover-
able unless the party moving for disclosure makes a "showing of neces-
sity or a demonstration that denial of the material would unduly
prejudice the preparation of the case or cause hardship or injustice."80
The work-product doctrine of Hickman, now codified in Rule 26(b)(3) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically applies to all docu-
ments prepared by either the prosecutor or his or her representative8' "in
anticipation of litigation." 8 2
In United States v. Nobles, the Supreme Court expanded its discus-
sion in Hickman by noting that the core justification for refusing discov-
ery of an attorney's work-product is that it is necessary to protect our
adversary system.83 As the Court stated, "[o]ne of [the realities of the
adversary system] is that attorneys often must rely on the assistance of
investigators" when preparing documents for trial.84 Thus, the doctrine
necessarily extends to criminal cases, excluding from discovery docu-
ments prepared for attorneys by law-enforcement personnel in prepara-
tion for trial.85
78 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
79 Id. at 510-11.
80 Id. at 509.
81 See In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 967 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that the work-
product doctrine protects materials prepared by the individual attorney or by an agent of the
attorney, as long as the documents were prepared in anticipation of litigation).
82 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
83 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
84 Id.
85 See id. at 237-39 (applying the work-product doctrine to a criminal case and finding
that the limitations on discovery in criminal cases extend to documents prepared by law-en-
forcement personnel); see also FED. R. CRiM. P. 16(a)(2) ("[T]his rule does not authorize the
discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made
by an attorney for the government or other government agent in connection with investigating
or prosecuting the case.").
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C. The Fundamental-Fairness Doctrine
The fundamental-fairness doctrine is yet another doctrine that ar-
guably strives to balance the competing interests of favoring disclosure
and protecting privacy. When applying this doctrine to cases in which
defense counsel has sought discovery of prosecutorial jury dossiers, state
and federal courts have struggled to find consistency. 86 Where the docu-
ments held by the prosecution include information readily available to
the public, such as prior jury service or convictions, many courts have
applied discovery rules narrowly to find that discovery is not required.87
On the other hand, some courts have found that, where the prosecutor's
failure to disclose information in jury dossiers creates inequity or damage
to the defendant, the judge may properly require a prosecutor to disclose
the requested information.88
Courts may draw an analogy between discovery of witness lists and
jury dossiers from the Supreme Court's holding in Wardius v. Oregon.8 9
There the Court held that, "in the absence of a strong showing of state
interests to the contrary, discovery must be a two-way street." 90 The
Supreme Court thus implied that if a trial court compels discovery of
defense documents, it must also compel discovery of prosecution docu-
ments. 91 The Court emphasized that the fundamental-fairness doctrine
requires courts to level the playing field; for instance, if the defendant
must "divulge the details of his own case," the prosecution cannot expect
to circumvent discovery of its own case materials. 92 In order to level the
playing field, therefore, fundamental fairness may require discovery of
bad-juror lists in certain instances.
86 Compare People v. Terrell, No. A125183, 2010 WL 2625579, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App.
June 30, 2010) (noting that knowledge of juror's previous voting history does not provide an
advantage; therefore, disclosure of such records is not required), with State v. Bessenecker,
404 N.W.2d 134, 138 (Iowa 1987) (explaining that, if the prosecution has access to jurors'
criminal records, the defense should be given the same information).
87 See, e.g., Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1958); Britton v. United
States, 350 A.2d 734 (D.C. 1975); Couser v. State, 383 A.2d 389 (Md. 1978); People v. McIn-
tosh, 376 N.W.2d 653 (Mich. 1985).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Kyle, 469 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1972); People v. Murtishaw,
631 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1981), overruled on other grounds by People v. Boyd, 700 P.2d 782 (Cal.
1985); Commonwealth v. Smith, 215 N.E.2d 897 (Mass. 1966).
89 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
90 Id. at 475.
91 See id. ("The State may not insist that trials be run as a 'search for truth' so far as
defense witnesses are concerned, while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own
witnesses.").
92 See id. at 476.
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1. Discoverability of Prosecutors' Jury Dossiers: The Strict
Approach
Courts that have deemed a prosecutor's records undiscoverable due
to a defendant's failure to make a sufficient showing of undue prejudice
sometimes provide guidance regarding what constitutes a sufficient
showing. Defendants have used the fundamental-fairness doctrine to
support disclosure of prosecutors' jury dossiers, even if prosecutors
claim the dossiers are protected work-product. 93 Some jurisdictions have
rejected the argument that denying the defense access to prosecutors'
jury dossiers is fundamentally unfair and have held that the state is not
required to provide defense counsel with information it has regarding
prospective jurors. 94
This strict approach is typically employed in cases in which the ma-
terial in the prosecution's possession is available to the general public.9 5
In these cases, the courts have refused to grant disclosure of the prosecu-
tors' work-product on the ground that defense attorneys cannot make a
sufficient showing of necessity or undue prejudice to justify disclosure.9 6
Courts often note two additional justifications for refusing discovery: (1)
uncertainty regarding the benefit afforded the defendant as a result of
93 See Losavio v. Mayber, 496 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Colo. 1972) (en banc) (explaining that,
despite the prosecution's argument that juror lists constitute work-product, disclosure is dic-
tated by "[tihe requirements of fundamental fairness and justice").
94 See Etheridge v. State, 903 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Martin v. State, 577
S.W.2d 490, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Linebarger v. State, 469 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971); Enriquez v. State, 429 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); see also People
v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1981) (noting that "all California decisions and a majority of
decisions from other jurisdictions have held that a trial court did not err in denying a defendant
access to prosecution jury records"), overruled on other grounds by People v. Boyd, 700 P.2d
782 (Cal. 1985).
95 See Couser v. State, 383 A.2d 389, 396 (Md. 1978) (denying the defendant's request
for disclosure and explaining that the dossier the defense sought from the prosecution con-
sisted of "information compiled about jurors from prior voir dire examinations and past voting
records, which was essentially in the public domain").
96 See, e.g., Murtishaw, 631 P.2d at 466 (stressing that "in any individual case it is en-
tirely speculative whether denial of access caused any significant harm to the defense"). Other
courts have held that a defendant is not entitled to prosecutors' jury dossiers unless he or she
can make a showing of prejudice, exceptional circumstances, or other compelling reasons.
State v. Wright, 344 So. 2d 1014, 1017 (La. 1977); see also Britton v. United States, 350 A.2d
734, 735 (D.C. 1976) (explaining that there is no general duty to disclose prosecutors' jury
dossiers unless there has been a prior governmental impetus that is likely to affect the juror's
service, thus causing hardship to the defendant); People v. Brawley, 461 P.2d 361, 371 (Cal.
1969) (noting the lack of case law holding that a defendant has the right to inspect a prosecu-
tor's jury dossier, in the absence of an exceptional showing); Commonwealth v. Smith, 215
N.E.2d 897, 900-01 (Mass. 1966) (noting the importance of the fact that the defendant did not
argue that he was deprived of a fair trial because of the advantage afforded to the prosecution).
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discovery of jury dossiers; and (2) the availability of information injury
dossiers through voir dire questioning of jurors.97
In Hamer v. United States, for example, the defendant argued that
the prosecutor's refusal to disclose "jury books" showing how members
of a jury panel voted on previous juries created "an unequal situation in
the selection of the jury."98 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held, however, that the prosecutor's use of the jury books did not
per se constitute a denial of the defendant's right to an impartial jury
trial.99 In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that, if the
mere fact that the prosecutor is in possession of more information on
jurors than the defense attorney necessitated a finding of a constitutional
violation, then "no defendant could be prosecuted by a government attor-
ney who had more information about how jurors on that panel had voted,
in other cases, than his own counsel had." 100 The court concluded that
"it is up to the individual judge to see that neither attorney has an unfair
advantage over the other, whether by use of jury lists or jury books, or
any other knowledge or information that exists with respect to a juror's
previous action." 01
Expanding on Hamer, the Maryland Court of Appeals in Couser v.
State affirmed the trial judge's ruling that the information in the prosecu-
tor's possession was undiscoverable work-product.102 As in Hamer, the
defendant in Couser argued that, even though the information was privi-
leged work-product, it should still be disclosed because "certain com-
ments in [the jury dossier] should be equally made known to both sides
97 Murtishaw, 631 P.2d at 465. The Louisiana Supreme Court has emphasized that a
defendant's failure to show both that the prosecutor actually used the list to conduct voir dire
and that the lack of disclosure of the list gave an advantage to the prosecution would be so
unfair as to warrant a reversal of the defendant's conviction. See State v. McGraw, 366 So. 2d
1278, 1286 (La. 1978) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to compel the prose-
cutor to disclose its record of jurors' prior voting behaviors).
98 259 F.2d 274, 278 (9th Cir. 1958).
99 See id. at 280 ("Whether the United States District Attorney's staff in any district
keeps a 'jury book' or not (written or mental), whether it keeps a black-list of the few 'sympa-
thetic jurors,' or a white list of the few 'hanging jurors,' cannot be considered error per se.").
100 Id. at 281; see People v. Terrell, No. A125183, 2010 WL 2625579, at *3 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 30, 2010) (explaining that a juror's previous voting history does not necessarily
indicate how that juror will vote in a different case, and therefore, knowledge of such voting
history does not provide any cognizable advantage). The court in Hamer added the following:
"Such a proposed rule would break down law enforcement in this country. It cannot be seri-
ously considered. Perfect equality in counsel can never be achieved, any more than there can
be two judges, or groups of judges, with precisely similar competence." 259 F.2d at 281.
101 Hamer, 259 F.2d at 281; see also Britton, 350 A.2d at 735 (noting that information
regarding a juror's prior jury service is not information likely to "escape the attention of a
reasonably diligent defense counsel").
102 See Couser v. State, 383 A.2d 389, 396 (Md. 1978) (stating that the court was not in
the position to decide whether the prosecutor's jury dossier constituted work-product and was
thus undiscoverable, but ruling that records of jurors' criminal histories, which are frequently
given to the prosecution by the police, would never qualify as work-product).
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of the case" and because it would be "helpful in allowing [him] to select
a jury as fairly as it is for the State to select a jury."10 3 In holding that
the defendant did not have the right to this information, the court empha-
sized that the defendant "did not allege that he was unable to obtain the
same information from other sources, that he would be unduly prejudiced
without it in selecting a fair and impartial jury, or even that the prosecu-
tor was actually using the dossier in selecting the jury." 0 4 Although the
case law is not uniform, these three factors are important in the inquiry
about what constitutes a sufficient showing of necessity or undue
prejudice to justify the disclosure of work-product. 0 5
Further, the Maryland court in Couser noted that the general rule of
discovery of prospective juror information in the prosecutor's possession
often "[does] not distinguish between public and nonpublic information
made available to the prosecutor for jury selection purposes." 0 6 The key
question is whether the defendant has received a fair and impartial jury in
light of all of the circumstances. 0 7 In Christoffel v. United States, for
example, the defendant asked for production of a copy of pages that ap-
parently consisted of additional juror information; the trial judge denied
the request. 08 On appeal, the court held that the trial judge's denial did
not merit reversal because defense counsel provided no evidence sup-
porting his theory that the additional documents in the prosecution's pos-
session would have provided some benefit to the defendant.109 In so
holding, the court failed to determine whether the materials in question
were readily available to the public.' 10 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit followed Christoffel in Best v. United States, holding
that defendants in a criminal case do not have a right to inspect prosecu-
tion documents regarding prospective jurors."' The court noted that the
103 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
104 See id at 396-97 (emphasizing that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause,
as well as Maryland's Declaration of Rights, granted criminal defendants the right to an impar-
tial jury).
105 See supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
106 Couser, 383 A.2d at 393-94; see, e.g., Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.
1950); Christoffel v. United States, 171 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev'd on other grounds,
338 U.S. 84 (1949).
107 Couser, 383 A.2d at 394.
108 171 F.2d at 1006.
109 See id. ("There is no evidence, and counsel did not attempt to introduce any, that the
government made any investigation, to say nothing of an improper one, of prospective
jurors.").
110 See id. (declining to compel disclosure of the government's notes simply because de-
fense counsel did not provide evidence regarding what information was included in the list).
Ill 184 F.2d at 141.
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voir dire process provides adequate opportunity to question prospective
jurors and that any contrary holding would be "pure speculation."I 12
Although some courts have followed the strict approach without ref-
erence to whether the information in the prosecution's possession is
available to the public, for other courts this distinction is key. In People
v. Stinson, the Michigan Court of Appeals refused to force a prosecutor
to disclose his jury dossier to defense counsel because the information in
the dossier was available to the general public." 3  The prosecutor had
been in possession of prior voting records of the jurors; in holding that
the prosecutor's dossier was not discoverable, the court emphasized that
the defendant was able to obtain this same information on his own.' 14 In
1977, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in People v. McIntosh, reaffirmed
the holding in Stinson, concluding that "[d]efendants have no constitu-
tional or statutory right to see jury dossiers compiled by the prosecutor
from public records.""i 5
Courts in several jurisdictions, therefore, have found that fundamen-
tal fairness does not necessarily require that trial judges mandate disclo-
sure of the prosecution's jury dossiers or additional information
regarding potential jurors. These courts posit that it is speculative
whether the defense would gain any benefit from the information in the
prosecution's possession. Moreover, the process of voir dire provides
defense counsel with the opportunity to question jurors and obtain the
same information. Especially when information is available to the pub-
112 Id. (noting that the defense must provide evidence that the resulting jury was unfair or
impartial to compel reversal of the trial court's denial of the motion). Other courts have relied
on the availability of other means of gathering the information in the prosecution's jury dossier
in finding that discovery of work-product is not required. See, e.g., State v. Blunt, 449 So. 2d
128, 130 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that, where the defendant is able to obtain the same
information that is in the prosecutor's possession, such as through public records or voir dire,
and where the defendant fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor intends to use the information
in conducting voir dire, a sufficient showing to justify the disclosure of work-product has not
been met); Linebarger v. State, 469 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (emphasizing
that defense counsel has an opportunity to obtain through voir dire all of the information that
was in possession of the government); see also Armstrong v. State, 897 S.W.2d 361, 365-66
(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc) (finding that the prosecution is not obligated to furnish
defense with documents and information that are "readily available" through voir dire
questioning).
113 227 N.W.2d 303, 311 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) (stressing that the same or similar infor-
mation was available to the defense counsel for examination).
1 14 See id. Further to this point, the North Carolina Supreme Court has been presented
with a defense request for access to police databases to which the district attorney has access,
but did not necessarily use in the present case. See State v. Smith, 532 S.E.2d 773, 779-80
(N.C. 2000). The court found that the information in question-potential jurors' prior convic-
tions-was readily available to the public through alternate means. See id. This implies that
the dispositive factor was that there were alternative means of obtaining the information, and
not whether the information was a benefit to the prosecution or a detriment to the defense. See
id.
' 15 252 N.W.2d 779, 782 (Mich. 1977).
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lic, these courts have found that there is no legal requirement that such
information must be handed over to the defense.
2. Discoverability of Prosecutors' Jury Dossiers: The Lenient
Approach
While the general rule is that there is no duty to disclose jury dos-
siers, some courts have recognized instances in which disclosure is nec-
essary in the interest of justice. Whatever doubts there may be regarding
the benefits gained through discovery of jury dossiers, prosecutors
clearly see the use of these lists as an advantage; otherwise, the use of
jury investigations and records would not be so prevalent.1 16 In order to
end the pattern of inequality, therefore, some courts have ruled that trial
judges must have discretion to compel discovery of jury dossiers in cer-
tain cases.' 17
In United States v. Kyle, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit recognized that there are some circumstances that
give rise to a need for disclosure. 8 The prosecutor in Kyle had knowl-
edge that "three of the jurors in the case [had served on a jury in another
case] which only two days earlier had been 'castigated' by another judge
for rendering a verdict of not guilty," and the prosecutor had neglected to
disclose this information to defense counsel.' 19 Although the court af-
firmed the defendant's conviction, it held that, "where there has been a
prior governmental impetus affecting a juror's prior service, and it is of a
nature likely to escape the attention of even reasonably diligent ap-
pointed counsel, considerations of basic fairness may generate a duty to
disclose." 20
Another exception to the general rule that prosecutors' jury dossiers
are not discoverable arises when law-enforcement agencies provide pros-
ecutors with nonpublic information to aid in the voir dire process. In
these cases, courts have typically ruled that this information must be dis-
116 See People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446, 465 (Cal. 1981) ("When courts . . . deny
defendants who cannot afford similar investigations access to the prosecutor's records, the
result is that prosecutors in case after case will have substantially more information concerning
prospective jurors than do defense counsel.").
I 7 See, e.g., id.
118 See 469 F.2d 547, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Ordinarily there would be no basis for a
duty to disclose material pertaining to public aspects of a juror's service, . . . but . .. considera-
tions of basic fairness may generate a duty to disclose.").
1 19 Id. at 548.
120 See id. at 551 (stressing that the information in the prosecutor's possession was availa-
ble to the public in holding that "[s]o long as matters are in the public domain, it is hard to
develop a general theory of disclosure").
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closed to defense counsel.121 In Commonwealth v. Smith, for example,
the prosecutor asked the police to interview potential jurors and to pre-
pare an investigatory report.12 2 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court found no reversible error for failing to disclose the report to de-
fense counsel because the trial judge's voir dire ensured that the jurors
had not been prejudiced;12 3 however, the court criticized the practice of
using police officers to gather information about prospective jurors when
the prosecutors were not making this information equally available to the
defense.124
In People v. Murtishaw,12 5 the California Supreme Court did more
than just condemn prosecutors' use of police officers to gather informa-
tion about prospective jurors. Murtishaw moved for either the prosecu-
tion's records of jurors or funds to hire an investigator of his own to
obtain the same information that was in the prosecution's possession.12 6
The trial court denied the motion.12 7 The California Supreme Court rec-
ognized that case law supported the trial court's decision.12 8 However,
the court recognized the "manifest unfairness" that would result if prose-
cutors could gather information on jurors and use that information to
their advantage while the defense lacked the necessary funds to conduct
its own investigation.12 9 The court reasoned that, even if the defendant
would not derive a benefit from the records and could obtain the same
information through voir dire, such "doubts cannot justify making the
results of the investigation available to one side but not to the other." 3 0
In commenting on how this "pattern of inequality reflects on the fairness
of the criminal process," the court held that trial judges in California
121 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, 215 N.E.2d 897, 900-01 (Mass. 1966) (explaining
that, when prosecutors use police officers to gather information about prospective jurors, this
information should be as available to the defense as it is to the prosecution).
122 Id. at 900.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 901 (emphasizing that, although the defendant did not argue that the list de-
prived him of his right to a fair trial, the public interest in ensuring a fair trial requires that
police investigations regarding jurors should be available equally to both sides); see also Sin-
clair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 764-65 (1929) (explaining that hiring a detective to
follow jurors during a trial fundamentally violates the right of a defendant to a fair and impar-
tial jury and creates a strong possibility of a mistrial).
125 631 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1981).
126 Id. at 450.
127 Id.
128 See id. at 465 (explaining that courts have denied defense counsel access to prosecu-
tors' records where it is unclear whether disclosing these records to the defense would give the
defendant an advantage and where the defendant is able to obtain this same information
through the voir dire process).
129 See id. ("When courts then deny defendants who cannot afford similar investigations
access to the prosecutor's records, the result is that prosecutors in case after case will have
substantially more information concerning prospective jurors than do defense counsel.").
130 Id.
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have the discretion to allow defense counsel to inspect any reports or
records that are in the prosecution's possession-regardless of whether
those records were obtained through outside investigation.13 i Despite
this holding, the court found no reversible error.132 The defendant did
not satisfy the test for prejudice under California law outlined in People
v. Watson: "'[A]ffirmatively appear[ing] to the satisfaction of this
court . . . that the accused may well have been substantially injured by
the error of which he complains . . . .""133 Thus, an error is not revers-
ible if "'it appears that a different verdict would not otherwise have been
probable.' "34
Yet another example of a court's allowing discovery of prosecution
jury lists was set forth by the Colorado Supreme Court in Losavio v.
Mayber, in which the court considered whether police records of jurors
in possession of the prosecution should be made available to the de-
fense.135 The court emphasized the importance of ensuring that the jus-
tice system operates according to principles of fundamental fairness and
mandated that the prosecution disclose to defense counsel the informa-
tion within its possession.13 6 The court held that police-department
records in possession of the prosecution are not public records as defined
by the state's Open Records Act and that the defense is entitled to view
such documents in possession of the prosecution.1 37 In so holding, the
court noted that both district attorneys and public defenders are under an
obligation to use any information at their disposal in an ethical and legal
manner, and, although there is no basis for an assumption that the district
attorney is using the documents in an inappropriate manner, fundamental
fairness mandates that the defense be afforded the same information.138
Courts have also addressed the question of whether jurors' criminal
records should be disclosed to defense counsel once they have been
turned over to the prosecution. Jurors' criminal records-or "rap
131 Id. at 466 (stating that the conviction need not be reversed in the present case because
it is "entirely speculative whether denial of access caused any significant harm to the
defense").
132 Id.
133 299 P.2d 243, 254 (Cal. 1956) (quoting People v. Watts, 247 P. 884, 890 (Cal. 1926)).
134 Id. (quoting People v. Kelso, 155 P.2d 819, 822 (Cal. 1945)).
135 See 496 P.2d 1032, 1033-34 (Colo. 1972) (en banc) (explaining that these records do
not constitute work-product and holding that, once these records have been given to the prose-
cution, they are no longer exempt from disclosure under the state's Open Records Act).
136 See id. at 1035 ("We should think that the district attorney's office would have more
important matters to handle than to engage in prolonged litigation on an issue the district
attorney could have promptly resolved by furnishing the public defenders with the same infor-
mation which the district attorney had received from the chief of police.").
137 Id.
138 See id. ("We can perceive far more reason to deny such information to [private enti-
ties] than to deny it to defense attorneys ethically charged with defending their clients to the
best of their abilities.").
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sheets," as they are colloquially called-are often turned over to defense
counsel when they are in the prosecution's possession.139 The rationale
behind granting the defense access to jurors' rap sheets is that the de-
fense has a significant personal stake in the selection of a fair jury, which
manifests in defense counsel's desire to ensure that the prosecution does
not have access to any information that gives it an unfair advantage.140
The Iowa Supreme Court, in State v. Bessenecker, recognized that, while
a defendant may have several different reasons for wanting access to
these lists, he ultimately seeks all of the information that is available to
the prosecutor so that he can competently exercise his peremptory
challenges.141
The cases in this section of the Article demonstrate that there are
circumstances in which fundamental fairness may require a prosecutor to
grant defense counsel access to information or documents regarding jury
information. Although courts have recognized this right, the finding of
reversible error in these situations is rare because defense counsel often
have little evidence to show that the defendant's right to a fair and impar-
tial jury was actually violated. The fundamental-fairness doctrine may
therefore mandate discovery of jury records, but with limitations im-
posed at the discretion of the trial judge.
3. Discoverability of a Prosecutor's Jury Records when the
Prosecutor Uses These Records to Refresh His or Her
Memory on the Witness Stand During a Batson Hearing
It has long been understood that the intentional exclusion of jurors
on the basis of certain attributes or characteristics violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.142 In Batson v. Kentucky,
the United States Supreme Court held that state actors cannot exercise
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner.143 In so holding, the
Supreme Court set forth a three-pronged test for determining whether a
139 See, e.g., Tagala v. State, 812 P.2d 604, 613 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the
state should disclose criminal records of jurors, especially where the state intends to use this
information during jury selection); State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 136 (Iowa 1987)
(en banc) (explaining that every defendant has a strong interest in ensuring that the impaneled
jury is fair).
140 See Tagala, 812 P.2d at 613 (emphasizing that fairness concerns should mandate that
defense counsel has equal access to information that the prosecution uses during voir dire).
141 404 N.W.2d at 138 (explaining that, because the court must protect the rights of the
jurors, the prosecution must obtain a court order to gain access to the rap sheets, and the
defense should then be given equal access to that information).
142 See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008); Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El ll),
545 U.S. 231 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El 1), 537 U.S. 322 (2003); J.E.B. v. Ala-
bama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Powers v.
Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
143 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986).
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prosecutor has engaged in impermissibly discriminatory conduct.' Ac-
cording to Batson, once the defendant has made a sufficient showing of
discrimination, the government has the burden of proving that the per-
emptory challenge was not exercised in a discriminatory manner.14 5 The
judge must then determine "'whether counsel is telling the truth in his or
her assertion that the challenge is not race-based.' "14 6 In this way, the
Batson analysis is meant to flush out any "implausible or fantastic justifi-
cations" that are used as mere pretexts to hide intentional
discrimination. 147
Although Batson and its progeny were premised on equal-protection
principles,148 the Supreme Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama had the opportu-
nity to rule on the constitutionality of a state actor's use of peremptory
challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of gender.149 The Court re-
viewed the state's use of nine of its ten peremptory challenges to strike
males during the voir dire process and extended Batson to cover such
challenges due to the long history of gender-discrimination.15 0 In under-
taking its Batson analysis, the Court reasoned that the state's conduct
was unconstitutional because discriminating in this manner "serves to
ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about
the relative abilities of men and women."s'5 The Court concluded that
discrimination in the voir dire process may harm both the individual de-
fendant, who may be prejudiced by the resulting jury, and the individual
jurors, who are excluded from the opportunity to take part in the judicial
process.15 2
144 See id. at 96-98 (holding that, to demonstrate that a prosecutor has engaged in the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, the defendant must establish a prima facie case
of discrimination by showing that "he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the
defendant's race" (citation omitted)); see also Miller-El 1, 537 U.S. at 328-29 (restating the
three-pronged test in Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, as the following: (1) "a defendant must make
a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race"; (2)
"if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the
juror in question"; and (3) "in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination").
145 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 126 (holding that the prosecutor "'must give a "clear and
reasonably specific explanation" of his "legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenges"'
(citation omitted)).
146 Hayes v. Thaler, 361 F. App'x 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1375 (5th Cir. 1993)).
147 Miller-El 1, 537 U.S. at 339 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95.
149 See 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
150 See id. at 129, 132-36 (surveying the history of gender-based discrimination through-
out the country's history and holding that state actors' use of peremptory challenges to inten-
tionally discriminate against jurors on the basis of gender violates the Equal Protection
Clause).
151 Id. at 131.
152 Id. at 140.
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Systematic exclusion of certain classes of people, even classes that
are not based on immutable characteristics, such as economic status, has
been held unconstitutional. For example, in Thiel v. Southern Pacific
Co., a pre-Batson case, the petitioner moved to strike the entire jury
panel on the ground that none of the jurors earned a daily wage.153 There
may be practical justifications for excluding potential jurors on the basis
of wealth-for example, that individuals earning a daily wage may suffer
actual hardship if required to serve on a jury.154 The Supreme Court,
however, held that federal or state law could not justify the exclusion of
all individuals who earned a daily wage.' 55 The Court emphasized the
importance of instilling faith in the jury system and ensuring that the
desire to discriminate against persons of low economic and social status
is not sanctioned.156
In more recent decisions, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Bat-
son framework. In Miller-El II, the Court emphasized that a Batson anal-
ysis uses a totality of the circumstances approach. 57 Miller-El objected
to the prosecution's striking of ten of eleven black venire persons, claim-
ing that the peremptory challenges were not legitimate as they were
based solely on race.'58 The trial judge rejected Miller-El's challenge,
finding no systematic and intentional exclusion of blacks as a matter of
policy.1 5 9 On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that ninety-one percent
153 See 328 U.S. 217, 219 (1946). The petitioner alleged that the fact that the jury was
composed of "mostly business executives" discriminated against the poor-the majority of
citizens. Id. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the respondent, the Clerk of the Court
and the Jury Commissioner testified that they had deliberately and intentionally excluded all
daily-wage earners from jury lists. Id. at 221. The result was that fifty percent of the individu-
als on the jury lists consisted of businessmen and their wives. Id. at 222.
154 See id. at 222-23 (finding that wage earners constitute a substantial enough portion of
the community that they "cannot be intentionally and systematically excluded in whole or in
part without doing violence to the democratic nature of the jury system").
155 Id. at 222.
156 See id. at 223-24 ("We would breathe life into any latent tendencies to establish the
jury as the instrument of the economically and socially privileged.").
157 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
158 See id. at 236 (noting that the defendant argued that the prosecution's peremptory
strikes "could not be presumed legitimate, given a history of excluding black members from
criminal juries by the Dallas County District Attorney's office").
159 Id. at 236-37. The procedural history of this case is complex and extensive. The trial
judge decided the case based on Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), and its "systematic
discrimination" requirement. While the appeal was pending, the Court decided Batson, which
replaced Swain's requirement with a three-pronged test. See Miller-El II. 545 U.S. at 236.
After appealing the conviction, again pressing the Batson challenge, Miller-El filed a habeas
corpus petition, which was also denied. Id. at 236-37. The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 534 U.S. 1122 (2002), and reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, finding "extensive evidence of purposeful discrimination ... before and during
his trial . . . ." See Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 237. The Fifth Circuit again rejected Miller-El's
claim on the merits; the Supreme Court again granted certiorari, Miller-El v. Dretke, 542 U.S.
936 (2004), and again reversed. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 237.
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of the eligible black venire members had been struck through peremptory
challenges.160 The Court compared the jurors of all races that had been
struck and found that, if these justifications were valid, then the prosecu-
tion's reasons for striking several black venire persons were unlikely
given that several white jurors should have been struck under the same
justifications.' 6 ' After extensive analysis of the prosecution's nondis-
criminatory justifications, the Court found that the "strikes correlate with
no fact as well as they correlate with race, and they occurred during a
selection infected by shuffling and disparate questioning that race ex-
plains better than any race-neutral reason advanced by the State." 62
Given the totality of the circumstances, therefore, the prosecution's dis-
criminatory intent established a constitutional violation.' 63
In a subsequent case, Snyder v. Louisiana, eighty-five prospective
jurors were questioned during voir dire.164 Of the thirty-five that sur-
vived challenges for cause, only five were black.165 The prosecution
eliminated all of the other black jurors with peremptory strikes.' 6 6 The
Supreme Court found that the prosecutor's justifications were "highly
speculative" at best and that, in light of the circumstances of the voir dire
process, the trial court's overruling of the defense's Batson challenge
was clear error.167 Additionally, the Court noted that the justifications
proffered by the prosecution could not be explored further on remand
because the justifications were based on the potential jurors' "nervous-
ness alone."' 68
160 Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241.
161 See id. 241-52 (surveying the prosecution's justifications for several peremptory
strikes of black jurors and pointing out that several white jurors could fall under the same
justifications, thus providing evidence that these justifications were merely pretextual).
162 See id. at 266.
163 See id.
164 552 U.S. 472, 475 (2008).
165 Id. at 476.
I66 Id. at 475-76.
167 See id. at 479-82, 486 (providing an overview of the voir dire process in the specific
circumstances). Although defense counsel challenged the exclusion of two specific black ju-
rors, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution's justification for one juror's exclusion was
not valid and, therefore, it only assessed the challenge with regard to the juror Mr. Brooks. Id.
at 478 (citing United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining
that "the Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory
purpose")). The prosecution proffered two justifications for striking Mr. Brooks: (1) that he
looked very nervous throughout the questioning; and (2) that he is a student teacher and would
be in a rush to go home quickly. Id. The Court assessed these two justifications and found
that, in light of the circumstances here-including absence of anything in the record showing
that the trial judge credited the claim that Mr. Brooks was nervous, the prosecution's descrip-
tion of both its proffered explanations as "main concem[s]," and the adverse inference noted
above-the record did not show that the prosecution would have pre-emptively challenged Mr.
Brooks based on his nervousness alone. Id. at 485 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
168 Id. at 485.
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Although the phenomenon of prosecutors' utilizing bad-juror lists
does not always implicate Batson, case law regarding whether these lists
are discoverable when prosecutors refer to them either before or during
their Batson hearings is instructive. Case law establishes that a prosecu-
tor must disclose notes on prospective jurors "when the prosecutor re-
freshes his or her memory regarding the exercise of peremptory
challenges by reviewing those notes before the Batson hearing."l 69 In-
terestingly, the question of whether a state actor must disclose his or her
jury dossier to defense counsel when he or she uses this record during a
Batson hearing has been the subject of much litigation, particularly in
Texas.
For example, in Pondexter v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals held in 1996 that a prosecutor's notes were discoverable only if
he actually used them during the Batson hearing for the purpose of re-
freshing his memory.o70 Although Pondexter placed a limit on the cate-
gorical rule that prosecutors' jury dossiers are discoverable when they
are used in relation to a Batson hearing, three years later, in Franklin v.
State, the court returned to the original meaning of this rule.17' The court
held that a prosecutor is required to turn over his jury dossiers when he
or she uses them in relation to a Batson hearing, regardless of whether
169 See Franklin v. State, 986 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (recognizing that
precedent suggests that a prosecutor must disclose any information he has on prospective ju-
rors when his peremptory challenge strikes are questioned during a Batson hearing), rev'd on
other grounds, 12 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see also Salazar v. State, 795 S.W.2d
187, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc).
170 942 S.W.2d 577, 582-84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
171 See 986 S.W.2d at 355 ("There is no apparent reason . . . to create a new category of
evidentiary exclusions solely for the benefit of witnesses during Batson hearings."). Analo-
gously, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals applied the Franklin analysis to find that, if a
witness uses a transcript or other document to refresh his or her memory before testifying in a
criminal trial, then the document must be provided to the other side. See Love v. State, No.
01-08-00941 -CR, 2009 WL 3930900, at *6 (Tex. App. Nov. 19, 2009). Even if the document
falls under the work-product privilege, it must be produced when used to refresh a witness's
memory. See id. The dispositive factor in determining whether the prosecution was required
to turn over the document is whether the document was in fact used "to refresh her memory or
relied on . . . for her opinions." See id. at *7. Such a fact must be proven by the party
requesting discovery; this burden is especially high when the document is not included in the
record because it is difficult for the court to determine whether its exclusion caused harm to
the defendant's case. See id (holding that, because the defendant neither proved that the
document was used to refresh the witness's memory nor showed that the document's exclusion
was harmful error, the trial court did not abuse its discretion). In an earlier case, the same
court applied Pondexter to business records not disclosed to the defendant. See Saldivar v.
State, 980 S.W.2d 475, 497 (Tex. App. 1998). In that case, the defendant requested discovery
of business records, both before trial and when a witness for the state testified; the trial court
denied both requests. Id. at 496-97. The appellate court found no evidence that the witness
had actually used the records requested to refresh his memory and, although the defendant
pointed to testimony outside the presence of the jury, the records were dispositive proof of the
crime; as long as the witness did not use the records to refresh his memory, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion. Id.
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the prosecutor referred to the notes before or during the hearing. 17 2 The
purpose of this rule is that discovery of these documents allows defense
counsel to "make a comparison analysis of the prosecution's peremptory
strikes" to determine if the justifications are valid and neutral.1 7 3 Be-
cause of the explicit purpose of the rule, the court explained in 2006, in
Brooks v. Armco, Inc., that a mere "use" of notes to confirm the truth of
the statements made during a hearing does not necessitate discovery of
notes.174 The court found the use "immaterial because the trial court
examined the notes in camera and verbally related their contents ... ."75
Thus, if defense counsel requests discovery of the prosecution's jury dos-
sier or notes, the notes should be discoverable as long as they might
reveal a misrepresentation or concealment of disparate treatment neces-
sary to establish a Batson violation.' 7 6 Where this is not possible, as in
Brooks, discovery is not required.
The original Batson analysis-requiring, as a threshold matter, a
prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge was exercised on the
basis of race-has been extended to include as discriminatory those chal-
lenges that are based on a variety of both mutable and immutable charac-
teristics. The systematic exclusion of an entire class of people-whether
based on race, gender, or economic background-has been held by the
Supreme Court to be unconstitutional. In so determining, the Court takes
into account all of the circumstances surrounding the case and the spe-
cific challenges to determine whether the intent of the attorney is dis-
criminatory. Critically, when an attorney uses a jury dossier during a
Batson hearing, the list is generally discoverable regardless of the attor-
ney's intent in using the list. Therefore, the use of jury dossiers during
Batson hearings may override other doctrines that tend to limit discov-
ery, such as the work-product doctrine and the strict approach to the fun-
damental-fairness doctrine.
172 Franklin, 986 S.W.2d at 355.
173 Salazar, 795 S.W.2d at 193 (providing for discovery of prosecution notes during a
Batson hearing because the prosecutor used the notes to refresh his memory regarding his
reasons for peremptory strikes).
174 194 S.W.3d 661, 666 (Tex. App. 2006) (pointing out that the defense counsel referred
to his notes several times during testimony, but that "he was only citing the notes to confirm
the truth of his testimony, rather than using the notes to refresh his memory").
175 Id. (stressing that, even if refusing to compel discovery was an error, in this case the
error was harmless).
176 See Leadon v. State, 332 S.W.3d 600, 618 (Tex. App. 2010) (explaining that defense
counsel failed either to request discovery of the prosecution's notes or to present evidence that
the notes contained some evidence of disparate treatment of jurors; therefore, the court held
that the race-neutral explanations were acceptable).
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II. FEDERAL AND STATE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACTS
A. The Federal Freedom of Information Act Provides a Useful
Vehicle for Understanding the Legislative Intent of State Open-
Records Acts
The federal FOIA enacted in 1966, provided a model for the
states.' 77 By 1973, thirty-eight states had enacted open-records acts.' 78
As noted in Part I, the language of FOIA is instructive regarding the
breadth and intent of prevalent state open-records acts.' 7 9
In general, FOIA's "law-enforcement exemption" recognizes that
law-enforcement agencies have a legitimate interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of certain documents "to prevent harm to the Govern-
ment's case in court."180 As a threshold matter, courts must determine
whether the document requested comes within the Section 7 exemp-
tions-i.e., whether it was "compiled for law enforcement purposes."' 81
This determination, however, is not always clear. If the document is
something that is regularly compiled by law enforcement in preparation
for a criminal trial, it likely falls within this exemption. It is arguable,
however, that once the bad-juror list is in the hands of the prosecution, it
is no longer serving a law-enforcement purpose. According to FOIA,
records compiled for law-enforcement purposes are exempt from disclo-
sure only if they:
(A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with en-
forcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a
right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted in-
vasion of personal privacy, [or] (D) could reasonably be
expected to disclose the identity of a confidential
source .... 182
The states that have utilized open-records acts to exempt bad-juror lists
from disclosure have focused on their own versions of Exemption
7(A).1 83 Further, if prosecutors fail under Exemption 7(A), they might
177 See, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court, 852 P.2d 377, 385 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (ex-
plaining that the California Legislature enacted the state's Public Records Act to address the
same concerns as FOIA); see also Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d
564, 568 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (same).
178 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 14, at 219.
179 See, e.g., Cnty. of Los Angeles, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 568 (holding that California's
statute "should receive a parallel construction" to FOIA).
180 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 227 (1978) (quoting S. REP. No.
89-813 (1965) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
181 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2006).
182 Id.
183 See, e.g., Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Decision No. 369, at 2 (Apr. 8, 1983), avail-
able at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/47mattox/ord/1983/pdfl/ORD19830
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argue that Exemption 7(C) applies. Therefore, the following analysis
discusses these two exemptions in greater depth.
Unlike the other subdivisions of Exemption 7, subdivision (A) does
not relate to an individual interest, but rather to a general "interference
with enforcement proceedings." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has applied a two-part test to this exemption.184 To prevent dis-
closure, the government must first establish that "a law enforcement pro-
ceeding is pending or prospective," and then must establish that the
"release of the information could reasonably be expected to cause some
articulable harm."' 85 Jury dossiers are clearly created when a trial is
"pending or prospective." The second part of the test is less obvious.
Prosecutors may argue that the release of jury dossiers will harm their
effectiveness in the jury-selection process. This is a weak argument,
however, since disclosure of the lists would actually augment the jury-
selection process by providing both parties with equal information.
In an Exemption 7(A) analysis, courts must also weigh the strong
presumption in favor of disclosure under FOIA against the risk of inter-
fering with trial proceedings.186 Unlike the Supreme Court's decision in
NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., in which compelling the disclosure
of witness statements would have resulted in changes to the substantive
discovery rules of unfair-labor-practice proceedings and substantial de-
lays in adjudication,' 8 7 the disclosure of jury dossiers would not cause
substantive changes in either the criminal trial process or appeals pro-
cess.188 The strong presumption in favor of disclosure, therefore, greatly
outweighs the disruption of the criminal process.
By contrast, Exemption 7(C) follows a more juror-centric approach,
exempting records when they "could reasonably be expected to consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . . . ."189 Prosecutors
could argue that this exemption applies if the court rejects nondisclosure
on the grounds of another exemption. The privacy interests protected in
Exemption 7(C) include the interest of preventing disclosure of an indi-
vidual's personal matters and "'the interest in independence in making
369.pdf (ruling on whether to force the prosecution to disclose computerized listings, dating
from about 1952, of all former jurors in criminal cases and holding that disclosure of the
prosecutors' subjective comments about these jurors would "tend to indicate the state's possi-
ble strategy in future prosecutions, and, in doing so, would compromise the state's effective-
ness in prosecuting criminal matters.").
184 See Manna v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1164 (3d Cir. 1995).
185 Id.
186 See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 236 (1978).
187 See id. at 237-38.
188 But see id. at 238 (explaining that, in unfair-labor-practice proceedings, unlike normal
trial circumstances, denial of a FOIA request is immediately reviewable by the district court,
whose decision is then reviewable by the court of appeals).
189 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006).
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certain kinds of important decisions."'l90 If there is no measurable pri-
vacy interest, then the exemption fails.19 1 Even if there is a measurable
privacy interest, however, the exemption may still fail if outweighed by a
public interest that is both specific and significant.19 2 By including this
secondary requirement, Congress requires courts to "balance the public
interest in disclosure against the interest Congress intended the Exemp-
tion to protect."l 9 3 To trigger this balancing test, the privacy interest in
nondisclosure of bad-juror lists need not be significant; rather, it must
only be more than de minimis.19 4
Although bad-juror lists may include a variety of information, some
of which may affect the privacy interests of the prosecutor, prosecutors
have an interest in keeping their personal impressions and comments pri-
vate in order to further the state's interest in impaneling a desirable jury.
Further, individual jurors have an interest in keeping personal facts that
are included in the list-e.g., home address, political affiliation, previous
voting history-shielded from the public eye.' 95 The individual juror's
interests, however, do not necessarily play prominently in this analysis.
Because the list is already compiled and disclosed to the prosecutor, the
190 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762
(1989) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977) (discussing the two privacy
interests involved-the personal interest in keeping private a person's use of specific types of
drugs and the more general interest in making important decisions independently, since the
statute may affect both patients' and doctors' use of specific drugs)).
191 See Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 958 F.2d 503, 510
(2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that the party opposing disclosure must first show "more than a de
minimis privacy interest" in order to trigger the balancing test, which requires the requesting
party to show a public purpose supporting disclosure). The court has explained that the pri-
vacy interest that must be shown for Exemption 7(C) purposes is a minimal one as compared
with, for example, Exemption 6, which exempts from disclosure "personnel, medical files, or
similar files," requiring more than a de minimis privacy interest. See id. at 509; see also 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). The party opposing exemption under Exemption 6 must show that the
invasion of privacy is "clearly unwarranted" in order to override the public interest in disclo-
sure. See U.S. Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 172 (1991). The burden of proving the
privacy invasion under Exemption 7(C), therefore, is lower than that under Exemption 6. See
id.
192 See Associated Press v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 554 F.3d 274, 288 (2d Cir. 2009)
(citing Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004)).
193 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 776.
194 See Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 958 F.2d at 510 ("Hence, once a more than de
minimis privacy interest is implicated the competing interests at stake must be balanced in
order to decide whether disclosure is permitted under FOIA.").
195 The Supreme Court has established that the individual's interest in keeping identifying
information out of the public eye is covered by FOIA's discussion of privacy. See Associated
Press, 554 F.3d at 285 (examining the various privacy interests that fall within the category
discussed in Exemption 7(C)); see also Ray, 502 U.S. at 176-77 (1991) (explaining that dis-
closure of unredacted interview summaries, which include personal information linked to in-
terviewees, constitutes more than a de minimis invasion of privacy); Dep't of Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 380-81 (1976) (recognizing that former cadets at the United States Air
Force Academy have a substantial interest in maintaining confidentiality).
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interest in the juror's privacy is de minimis at most. However, the pri-
vacy interest of the prosecutor may rise to the level necessary to trigger
the balancing test because he or she has an interest in protecting informa-
tion that may be contained in the bad-juror list, such as the prosecutor's
personal notes and information necessary to plead his or her case. De-
pending on the information included in bad-juror lists, the prosecutor's
interest may be strong enough that it must be taken into account when
determining if the law-enforcement exemption applies.
Since the prosecutor might arguably have an interest in shielding
personal jury lists from the public, courts must balance that interest with
the public interest of promoting disclosure.196 This analysis must be
made while keeping in mind that "there is only one relevant [public]
interest, namely, 'to open agency action to the light of public scru-
tiny' ";197 the proffered public interest "'cannot turn on the purposes for
which the request for information is made' " or on "'the identity of the
requesting party . . .' "198 In the case of bad-juror lists, the public inter-
est is substantial. Not only does the individual defendant have an interest
in obtaining the information in the prosecutor's bad-juror list during voir
dire to ensure that the resulting jury is fair and impartial, but the public
also has a general interest in ensuring that prosecutors are choosing juries
based on valid justifications rather than discriminatory intentions.199 The
public interest in compelling disclosure also promotes fairness in the en-
tire justice system 200 by ensuring that one side in the adversary process
does not have an unfair advantage over the other.
Once courts have established a sufficient public interest in disclo-
sure of bad-juror lists, they must then determine whether this public in-
terest would be served by disclosure of the lists. The Supreme Court
held in National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish that "the
requester must produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reason-
able person that the alleged Government impropriety might have oc-
curred." 201 In the case of bad-juror lists, therefore, defendants must
show that the prosecution used or planned to use information to which
the defendant did not have access in such a way that did or would de-
prive the defendant of the right to a fair and impartial jury. Although this
evidence is difficult to establish, the use of these lists by prosecutors
196 See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 771 (stating that, once a
measurable privacy interest is established, the requesting party must provide a public purpose
that would warrant an invasion of that interest).
197 Associated Press, 554 F.3d at 285 (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press,
489 U.S. at 772).
198 Id. (quoting Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. at 771).
199 See supra Part I.C.2.
200 See supra Part I.C.
201 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004).
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supports the presumption that prosecutors believe some benefit is derived
from the information in the lists and that such a benefit is likely to be
detrimental to the defendant's interests. 202 To protect the public interest
in a fair adversarial process and the individual defendant's interest in a
fair trial with an impartial jury, courts should thus decline to apply
FOIA's law-enforcement exemption to bad-juror lists.
Although prosecutors may argue that bad-juror lists are exempt
under either Exemption 7(A) or 7(C), FOIA's strong presumption favor-
ing disclosure should foreclose both of these exemptions. Since similar
exemptions are included in many state open-records acts, the analysis
under FOIA will be influential. 203 Most importantly, analysis of the state
acts must begin with the presumption in favor of openness, which simi-
larly forecloses exemption of bad-juror lists under FOIA.
B. An Analysis of Prevalent State Open-Records Acts Shows that
These Statutes Do Not Exempt Bad-Juror Lists from Disclosure
An analysis of various states' open-records acts suggests that the
legislators did not intend for these acts to shield information of the type
included in prosecutors' jury dossiers from disclosure. 204 For example,
Oklahoma's Open Records Act followed FOIA's stated need for public
openness; it was implemented "to ensure and facilitate the public's right
of access to and review of government records so they may efficiently
and intelligently exercise their inherent political power."205 Other states
that have implemented open-records acts, sometimes called "Right to
Know" laws, cite the same goal of ensuring that the public has the right
to access these records. 206 Further, the explicit intent of these laws to
202 Although not analyzed in the FOIA context, the Supreme Court of California stated in
People v. Murtishaw that "[w]hatever doubts the courts may have, it is apparent that the prose-
cutor here believes the advantage he gains from jury investigations and records justifies the
expense." 631 P.2d 446, 465 (Cal. 1981).
203 See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
204 See N.J. STA-r. ANN. § 47:1A-1 (West 2011) (declaring that "government records shall
be readily accessible for inspection, copying, or examination by the citizens of this State ...
for the protection of the public interest"); OI-A. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.2 (West 2011)
(providing that "it is the public policy of the State of Oklahoma that the people are vested with
the inherent right to know and be fully informed about their government").
205 OKLA. S'rAr. ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.2 (West 2011).
206 See, e.g., TiEx. Gov'T CoD! ANN. § 552.001(a) (West 2011) (stating that the legisla-
tive intent behind the implementation of Texas's Open Records Act was to facilitate broad
access to public information); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A- I (West 2011) (stating that
exceptions to the Open Records Act should be "construed in favor of the public's right to
access"); Hardaway Co. v. Rives, 422 S.E.2d 854, 857 (Ga. 1992) (emphasizing that any stat-
ute exemptimg certaim items from disclosure under Georgia's Open Records Act must be "nar-
rowly construed"); A Message from Terry Mutchler, Executive Director, Penn. Office of Open
Records, http://openrecords.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/openrecords/4434 (stating
that the Right-to-Know law "fosters accountability, prevents abuses of power and promotes
trust in government").
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construe disclosure in favor of the public's right defeats the presumption
that they were meant to exempt bad-juror lists.
1. Bad-Juror Lists Are Not Exempt from Disclosure Under the
First Prong of Texas's Open Records Act
Bearing in mind the Texas Legislature's intent to facilitate broad
access to public information when construing its Open Records Acts, a
statutory analysis shows that bad-juror lists are readily discoverable. 207
The Texas Open Records Act provides that a record of a law-enforce-
ment agency or prosecutor is exempted from disclosure only in the fol-
lowing circumstances: if its disclosure would interfere with law-
enforcement proceedings; if it relates to an investigation from which a
conviction was not obtained; or if it was prepared "in anticipation of or
in the course of preparing for criminal litigation . . . or [it] reflects the
mental impressions or legal reasoning of an attorney representing the
state." 2 0 8 Based on these provisions, Tarrant County's bad-juror list
would not be exempt from disclosure. The main area of focus should be
the first prong-whether disclosure would interfere with law-enforce-
ment proceedings. But first, a caveat: one might argue that, because the
Act states that it should be liberally construed, the plain meaning of the
statute would extend this liberal construction to the exemptions as well.
By broadening the scope of the exemptions, the adjudicatory body would
effectively limit public access. By this thinking, the Texas Open
Records Act would become inherently contradictory and stand alone
among other states' open-records acts and FOIA, all of which promote
broad access. This broad interpretation of the exemptions would thus
erroneously and unfairly deny disclosure of bad-juror lists.
In analyzing the first prong of Texas's Open Records Act 209-the
"interference with law enforcement" exemption-the primary preceden-
tial administrative decision on the question of whether prosecutorial
207 See TEx. CoDE ANN. § 552.001(a) (West 2011) ("The provisions of this chapter shall
be liberally construed . . . .").
208 See id. § 552.108(b); see also supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
209 Whether the Tarrant County bad-juror list is exempt from disclosure under the second
and third prongs of the Texas Open Records Act-concerning the work-product doctrine, TiEX.
COon ANN. § 552.108(a) (West 2011)-is beyond the scope of this portion of the Article, as
the Texas Attorney General's Office has addressed only the first prong. The second prong of
the Texas Open Records Act was discussed in Flores v. Fourth Court ofAppeals, in which the
Supreme Court of Texas developed a two-pronged analysis of what constitutes information
prepared in anticipation of litigation. 777 S.W.2d 38, 40-41 (Tex. 1989). The court deter-
mined that, in order to be exempt from discovery, there must be an objective indication that
litigation is imminent and that the party opposing discovery must have a good faith belief that
litigation would ensue. Id. While a prosecutor could argue that future criminal litigation in
general is imminent, the court's test relied on the facts surrounding the case. Id. Therefore, an
interpretation of the Texas Open Record Act's exemption that extends to any future litigation
would contravene the Texas Supreme Court's definition of "anticipation of litigation."
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materials fall under this exemption is Open Records Decision No. 369,
issued by Texas Attorney General Jim Mattox in 1983.210 When re-
sponding to the Tarrant County prosecutor's argument in 2010 that the
District Attorney's bad-juror list constituted work-product, Texas Assis-
tant Attorney General James Morris agreed in his Open Records Letter
Ruling that the list was exempt from disclosure. 2 11 Instead of relying on
the work-product doctrine to prevent disclosure of the list, however,
Morris erroneously relied on a sparse administrative history as a founda-
tion for finding the list exempt from disclosure under Texas's Open
Records Act, citing the 1983 decision. 212
The 1983 decision cited two other Texas Attorney General Open
Records Decisions that recognize interference with law-enforcement pro-
ceedings as a valid foundation for denying disclosure requests. In 1980,
Open Records Decision No. 252 determined that information regarding
investigatory techniques from an administratively closed investigation
should be disclosed to the public, except where that information may
threaten the safety or privacy of witnesses or subject them to intimidation
or harassment. 213 In 1982, Open Records Decision No. 340 distin-
guished the 1980 decision, denying the disclosure of an investigatory file
based on the ongoing nature of the investigation. 214 That the investiga-
tion was ongoing was material because the Assistant Attorney General
who wrote Open Records Decision No. 340 distinguished that case at
hand from Open Records Decision No. 252, in which there was no fear
that disclosure would unduly interfere with law-enforcement proceedings
because the investigation had concluded. 215
Open Records Decision No. 369, on which Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Morris's Open Records Letter Ruling relied, extended this exemp-
tion to the effectiveness of state prosecutions. 216 The decision denied
disclosure of information regarding former jurors based on the potential
210 See Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Decision No. 369 (Apr. 8, 1983), available at
https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/47mattox/ord/1983/pdflORDI9830369.pdf.
211 See Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Ltr. Rul. 2010-13557 (Sept. 7, 2010), available at
https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/50abbott/orl/2010/pdf/or201013557.pdf.
212 See id.
213 See Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Decision No. 252 (Sept. 16, 1980), available at
https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/46white/ord/1980/pdf/ORDI9800252.pdf
(requiring disclosure of investigative techniques and procedures, but denying disclosure of
witness information).
214 See Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Decision No. 340 (Dec. 31, 1982), available at
https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/46white/ord/1982/pdf/ordl9820340.pdf
(finding that "[p]olice investigations into incidents of death by other than natural causes are
rarely closed completely," whereas in Open Records Decision No. 252 no continuing investi-
gations existed into the deaths of the victims).
215 See id.
216 See Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Decision No. 369 (Apr. 8, 1983), available at
https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/47mattox/ord/1983/pdf/ORD9830369.pdf.
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interference with future prosecutions. 2 17 Decision No. 369 selectively
relies on the case Linebarger v. State and fails to give credence to the
distinction drawn between a closed investigation and an ongoing investi-
gation in the previous open-records decisions. 2 18 The decision justifies
its denial based on Linebarger's holding that the "State has no obligation
to furnish counsel for accused with information he has in regard to pro-
spective jurors." 219 However, Decision No. 369 fails to consider that the
court in Linebarger explicitly noted that the information withheld was
readily available to defense counsel on voir dire following the holding.2 2 0
By selectively relying on Linebarger and failing to recognize the
factual distinctions in the other administrative decisions, the Texas Attor-
ney General's Office broadened the scope of the Open Record Act's ex-
emption beyond the confines of the Legislature's intent. Moreover, the
Decision expanded the scope of ongoing investigations to future investi-
gations, thus broadening the exemption beyond the scope permitted by
any other state's legislation. 2 2 1 While the Texas Open Records Act itself
is inherently contradictory in its broad reading of the exemptions, the
decisions of the attorney generals over several administrations to expand
the scope of information that is exempted suggests a trend toward pro-
tecting prosecutorial interests over those of defense counsel. Thus, the
1983 Open Records Decision lacks consistency with prior decisions, fails
to promote public openness, and ignores FOIA's legislative intent to be
construed in favor of the public. 2 22
This string of Open Records Act Decisions demonstrates the impor-
tance of the existence of an ongoing law-enforcement investigation to a
court's finding that disclosure of records in the prosecution's possession
would interfere with the effective administration of law enforcement.
The Tarrant County District Attorney's Office updates its bad-juror list at
the conclusion of every criminal trial; all juror information contained in
the list, therefore, relates to criminal trials that have already con-
cluded. 2 2 3 The case law, coupled with the Texas Legislature's intent to
promote public openness, evinces that Assistant Attorney General Morris
217 See id.
218 See Linebarger v. State, 469 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
219 See id. at 167.
220 See id.
221 See, e.g., GA. Coon ANN. § 50-18-72(a)(4) (Supp. 2011) (exempting only records in
pending investigations or prosecutions).
222 Furthermore, the 2012 Texas Public Information Handbook, issued by the Office of
the Attorney General, recognizes that § 552.108 of the Texas Code has the same scope as
§ 552(b)(7) of FOIA. OFFICE OF THE Arr'y GEN. OF TEx., 2012 PuLIc INFORMAION HAND-
BOOK 96 (2012), available at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/AG-Publications/pdfs/publicinfohb.
pdf; see A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668, 678 (Tex. 1995) (holding that the
scope of the interference-with-law-enforcement exemption is the same as that in FOIA).
223 See Editorial, supra note 2.
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incorrectly ruled that the Tarrant County bad-juror list was exempt from
disclosure under the Act.
2. Bad-Juror Lists Are Not Exempt from Disclosure Under
Georgia's Open Records Act
Like the Texas Act, Georgia's Open Records Act also contains an
"interfering with law enforcement" provision. 2 2 4 Unlike the Texas Act,
however, the Georgia Act explicitly states that records will not be ex-
empt from disclosure unless the criminal investigation to which they re-
late is ongoing. 225 While early Texas Open Records Decisions indicate
that the first prong of the Texas statute was meant to be satisfied only
when a criminal investigation was ongoing at the time disclosure was
requested, 226 Georgia's Open Records Act manifests the same intent but
through clear and direct language. 227 Pursuant to the Georgia Act, a pub-
lic record is exempt from disclosure if it would: (1) disclose the identity
of a confidential source; (2) endanger anyone; or (3) disclose a confiden-
tial investigation. 2 2 8 Further, a public record is exempt from disclosure if
it consists of "[r]ecords of law enforcement ... in any pending investiga-
tion or prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity . . . ; provided, how-
ever, that an investigation or prosecution shall no longer be deemed to be
pending when all direct litigation involving said investigation and prose-
cution has become final or otherwise terminated . . . ."229 Since bad-
juror lists are compiled at the end of each trial and contain information
relating to a closed case, this language ensures that such information
would not clear the exemption's interference threshold.
The Georgia Open Records Act's exemption of jury-list data pro-
vides additional support for rejection of the exemption. Section 50-18-
72(a)(4.2) of the Georgia Code limits disclosure of information relating
to statewide master jury lists compiled by the Superior Court Clerks of
Georgia. 2 3 0 Notably, however, the Georgia Legislature provided for ju-
dicial discretion, allowing the court to release data in response to "a chal-
lenge to the array of the grand or trial jury . . . ."231 While this dual
exception is strictly limited to the Superior Court Clerks, its similarity to
224 See GA. CoDEi ANN. § 50-18-72 (Supp. 2011).
225 See id. § 50-18-72(a)(4).
226 See, e.g., Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Decision No. 340 (Dec. 31, 1982), available
at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/46white/ord/1982/pdf/ordl9820340.pdf.
227 See GA. CoDE ANN. § 50-18-72(a)(4) (Supp. 2011).
228 Id. § 50-18-72(a)(3).
229 Id. § 50-18-72(a)(4).
230 See id. § 50-18-72(a)(4.2) (exempting "jiury list data, including, but not limited to,
persons' names, dates of birth, addresses, ages, race, gender, telephone numbers, social secur-
ity numbers, . . . and other confidential identifying information that is collected . . . for the
purpose of establishing and maintaining county jury source lists").
231 Id.
2012]1 39
40 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
a Batson challenge that could be brought by the defense suggests that the
Georgia Legislature authorizes the disclosure of jury information in cer-
tain circumstances in order to preserve the integrity of juries. These pol-
icy considerations indicate a willingness to broadly construe the
legislation in favor of public disclosure.
A statutory analysis of Georgia's Open Records Act demonstrates
that the Tarrant County bad-juror list would not be exempt from disclo-
sure in the state of Georgia. Not only would disclosing the list not reveal
any confidential information that would jeopardize a law-enforcement
investigation, but the information contained in the prosecutor's list also
does not concern a pending or ongoing criminal investigation. Similar to
the Tarrant County situation, expanding the meaning of "pending" to in-
clude future or anticipated investigations would contravene the purpose
of the Georgia statute to favor public openness, as evidenced by the flex-
ibility of the exceptions in some cases. 2 32 Thus, Georgia's Act is more
consistent with the goal of ensuring broad access to public information
than Texas's malleable language.
3. Bad-Juror Lists Are Not Exempt from Disclosure Under
Alabama's Open Records Act
Alabama's Open Records Act is even more consistent with ensuring
broad access to public records than Georgia's analogous Act. 2 3 3 Pursu-
ant to this statute, all information is discoverable unless the information
fits into specific categories, none of which relate to law enforcement or
prosecution.234 Although the Alabama Act does not provide for an "in-
terfering with law enforcement" exemption, the Act provides for a much
more general counterpart-the exemption of "records the disclosure of
which would otherwise be detrimental to the best interests of the pub-
lic . . . ."235 While a prosecutor might argue that disclosure of a bad-
juror list could interfere with effective prosecution, which might thus be
detrimental to the public's interest, this argument is unlikely to survive
232 See, e.g., Atlanta v. Corey Entm't, Inc., 604 S.E.2d 140, 142 (Ga. 2004) (quoting
Athens Observer, Inc. v. Anderson, 263 S.E.2d 128, 130 (Ga. 1980)).
233 See ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (West 2011) ("Citizens' rights - Exceptions").
234 See id. This provision exempts from disclosure "registration and circulation records
and information concerning the use of the public, public school or college and university li-
braries of this state," as well as
records concerning security plans, procedures, assessments, measures, or systems,
and any other records relating to, or having an impact upon, the security or safety of
persons, structures, facilities, or other infrastructures, . . . the public disclosure of
which could reasonably be expected to be detrimental to the public safety or welfare,
and records the disclosure of which would otherwise be detrimental to the best inter-
ests of the public . ...
Id.
235 Id.
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scrutiny for two reasons-the wording of the statute and the legislative
intent.
First, Alabama's statute does not reveal an intention to exempt law-
enforcement records from disclosure because the legislature excluded
plain language exempting this type of discovery while specifically pro-
viding exemptions for several other categories of public records.236 The
Alabama courts have explicitly stated that the exemptions must be nar-
rowly construed. 237 Moreover, the language of the Alabama Act serves
as a safeguard to prevent exceptions that were not intended to be used by
public officials to avoid disclosure of specific information. 2 3 8
Second, to force disclosure of a bad-juror list rather than to shield it
from public access would be more in line with the legislative intent ac-
companying the Alabama Act. In exempting "records the disclosure of
which would otherwise be detrimental to the best interests of the pub-
lic," 23 9 the Act shows that the legislature intended that justice be served.
Although the Alabama Supreme Court in Stone suggested that a balanc-
ing must occur between the public's interest in knowing what their pub-
lic officers are doing in the discharge of their duties and the public's
interest in having government business carried on without undue interfer-
ence,2 4 0 only a very broad reading of the best-interests exemption would
permit an interference in favor of the prosecution regarding bad-juror
lists. As discussed previously, disclosure would not pass muster under
an "interference" argument. Therefore, because fairness and the best in-
terests of the public are best served by allowing defense counsel equal
access to the information in the prosecution's possession,241 the language
of Alabama's statute makes clear that its statute would not apply to the
Tarrant County bad-juror list.
236 See id.
237 See Stone v. Consol. Pub. Co., 404 So. 2d 678 (Ala. 1981). For an equivalent state-
ment in Georgia, see Hardaway v. Rives, 422 S.E.2d 854 (Ga. 1992).
238 See, e.g., Stone at 404 So. 2d at 681 (stating that courts will use a rule of reason to
determine whether a public record must be disclosed to avoid abuse of the exceptions to the
Alabama Act) (citing State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 568 P.2d 1236, 1243 (N.M. 1977) ("We
hold that a citizen has a fundamental right to have access to public records. The citizen's right
to know is the rule and secrecy is the exception. Where there is no contrary statute or counter-
vailing public policy, the right to inspect public records must be freely allowed.")).
239 ALA. Coon § 36-12-40 (West 2011).
240 See Stone, 404 So. 2d at 681.
241 See Trainor, supra note I (reporting that the prosecutors who were involved in main-
taining the list did not respond to requests from journalists who wanted their comments on the
purpose of the list).
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4. Bad-Juror Lists Are Not Exempt from Disclosure Under
Colorado's Open Records Act
The Tarrant County list would also not be exempt from disclosure
under Colorado's Open Records Act due to the statute's broad construc-
tion and narrowly defined "law enforcement purpose." Since Colorado
courts have given great deference to the definition of "public records" in
the Act itself,2 4 2 any writing made and maintained by a district attorney's
office would fit squarely within the Act's explicit language. Further, be-
cause the district attorney's office falls under a political subdivision of
the state involving the receipt of public funds, a jury list would thus be
subject to disclosure as a "public record."24 3
The broad construction of the Colorado Open Records Act promot-
ing public openness also supports this conclusion. 244 Since the Colorado
Supreme Court in Losavio v. Mayber specifically excluded the use of
prosecutors' jury lists from the scope of "law enforcement pur-
pose[s]," 2 4 5 bad-juror lists would not survive under this exception.
While the case referred to information compiled by law enforcement for
use by prosecutors during the voir dire process, 246 it would follow that
information compiled by prosecutors themselves during trial would simi-
larly fall outside the scope of the exemption. Based on the Colorado
legislature's broad definition of "public records" subject to the Open
Records Act and the Colorado Supreme Court's narrow construction of
the Act's exceptions, Colorado presents a particularly stringent standard
of disclosure that would not be overcome by a prosecutor's jury list, like
the one in Tarrant County.
The common feature among the various state open-records acts dis-
cussed in this Article is that of deference to the public interest in promot-
ing government openness. Both the Georgia Act and the Colorado Act
include specific language and narrow exceptions permitting nondisclo-
sure only in cases in which the public's interests would be harmed. The
Texas Act also contains specific language promoting openness, and its
law-enforcement exception should be narrowly construed to maintain in-
ternal consistency and to adhere to early administrative history. Al-
though the language in the Alabama Act's exception is fairly broad, the
public's interest is still central to the Act, both in promoting disclosure
and in protecting information, and demands a narrow reading. Based on
242 See supra Part I.A.2(d).
243 As the primary law-enforcement mechanism of a county or state subdivision, district
attorney's offices are subject to state funding regulations. See, e.g., Corn. Riv. STAr. ANN.
§ 20-1-301 (West 2011) (setting compensation and budget for district attorney offices).
244 See Ritter v. Jones, 207 P.3d 954, 957 (Colo. App. 2009).
245 496 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Colo. 1972) (en banc).
246 See id. at 1033.
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available case law and administrative decisions in these four states, no
intention to exclude prosecutorial materials from closed investigations
and proceedings under the law-enforcement exception or under Ala-
bama's broader exception is expressed. Thus, Tarrant County's bad-ju-
ror list would likely not survive as protected information under most
state open-records acts that favor public openness.
m. THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE IS OVERCOME WITH REGARD TO
THE DISCLOSURE OF BAD-JUROR LISTS BECAUSE NOT GRANTING
THE DEFENSE ACCESS TO THESE LISTS Is UNJUST
As illustrated through the third prong of the Texas Open Records
Act, the work-product doctrine is a principle that prosecutors often cite
as justification for why prosecutors should not have to disclose their dos-
siers. 247 Although there is a presumption against disclosure of an attor-
ney's work-product, courts have held that it should be disclosed where a
defendant can make a "showing of necessity or any indication or claim
that denial of such production would unduly prejudice the preparation of
[his] case or cause him any hardship or injustice." 248 Because of the
presumption against disclosure of "material prepared . . . in anticipation
of litigation," 249 the defendant seeking to compel disclosure of jury dos-
siers carries a high burden to prove that not disclosing will cause hard-
ship or injustice.250
A. The Fundamental-Fairness Doctrine Mandates the Disclosure of
Bad-Juror Lists
Due to the work-product doctrine's strong protection of documents
prepared "in anticipation of litigation," this doctrine favors nondisclosure
247 See Ti-x. Gov'-r Coo- ANN. § 552.108(a) (West 2011) (providing for an exemption
from disclosure if a public record includes the mental impressions of a state attorney).
248 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947).
249 United States v. Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1265 (3d Cir. 1990). Although de-
fendants may posit that bad-juror lists are not necessarily "prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion" because the lists may be used by more than one attorney in more than one trial, this
argument is specious. The lists are likely prepared for the specific trial because it would not be
helpful to include information about jurors who are not on the voir dire panel. Even if the lists
are prepared more generally, by compiling information regarding all jurors that the specific
office or attorney has encountered, courts have all but foreclosed the idea that documents must
be prepared in anticipation of the particular trial to fall within the work-product doctrine. See,
e.g., In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation, No. 08-md-2002, 2011 WL 4974269,
at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2011). As long as the document "was prepared primarily in anticipa-
tion of future litigation," the document will fall within the purview of the work-product doc-
trine's protections. Id.
250 See Processed Egg, 2011 WL 4974269, at *5 (stating that the anticipation of litigation
need only be objectively reasonable and it need not pertain to the present litigation, thus plac-
ing a high burden on the party seeking disclosure and a lower burden on the party seeking
nondisclosure).
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of the bad-juror lists discussed in this Article. Instead, courts should find
categorically that the prosecution's refusal to disclose bad-juror lists
causes injustice, which is sufficient to overcome the work-product doc-
trine's presumption against disclosure. Many courts have taken a strict
approach to the fundamental-fairness doctrine, however, and refuse to
grant disclosure of the prosecution's work-product 251 if a defendant will
have the opportunity to ask the jurors questions on voir dire.2 5 2
Although courts applying this approach have generally refused to
force prosecutors to disclose their jury dossiers on the ground that de-
fendants are able to obtain the same information, 253 it is unclear whether
voir dire is an effective avenue for this purpose. In fact, most defendants
are unable to obtain the same information through voir dire that the pros-
ecution has in its dossiers.254 Even wealthy defendants, who, unlike
most defendants, are often able to employ many of the same methods
used by prosecutors to guide voir dire questioning, cannot account for the
experience of prosecutors who are in the courtroom daily and the inher-
ent limitations of the voir dire process.255 Much of the information con-
tained in these bad-juror lists relates to jurors' voting records from prior
criminal trials, 2 5 6 and trial judges retain discretion to prevent jurors from
being asked about their prior voting records. 257 Courts also sometimes
exercise this discretion to bar attorneys from questioning jurors about
251 See, e.g., Couser v. State, 383 A.2d 389, 389 (Md. 1978) (emphasizing the importance
of the defendant's showing of harm to a finding that the prosecution's list should be disclosed).
252 See, e.g., Linebarger v. State, 469 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (stating
that the unfairness to the defendant can be remedied by a sufficient opportunity to question
jurors during voir dire).
253 See supra text accompanying note 112.
254 See Redd v. State, 578 S.W.2d 129, 130-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (indicating that
trial courts can take any precautions they choose to limit the voir dire process).
255 See Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN.
L. REV. 545, 559-61 (1975) (stating that wealthy or "political" defendants can employ profes-
sionals to advise attorneys on the most effective use of the voir dire process and that the
government is often provided juror information on an "informal" basis). Babcock further
posits that "all of those who can afford to obtain such information do so is, as the Supreme
Court said of the right to counsel, evidence for believing that information about prospective
jurors is not a 'luxury' but a 'necessity."' Id. at 561 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963)). Such knowledge about prospective jurors, therefore, is implicit in the right
to counsel. See id. Therefore, Babcock argues, the state must be required to turn over infor-
mation to those who cannot afford the same access. See id. at 561-62.
256 See, e.g., Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Decision No. 369 (Apr. 8, 1983), available
at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/47mattox/ord/ I 983/pdf/ORD 19830369.
pdf (noting that the bad-juror list at issue consisted of background information on the jurors
and the resulting verdict and sentence from all of the jurors' prior criminal trials).
257 See, e.g., Bolden v. State, 634 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (relating the
defendant's argument that he was entitled to discover the jurors' prior voting records because,
"[s]ince this information was allegedly possessed by the State, . . . his inability to obtain the
same deprived him of a fair and impartial trial").
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their prior voting records altogether. 258 This discretion, therefore, may
ensure that the defendant does not have the ability to obtain some of the
information contained in bad-juror lists through voir dire.
In keeping with the discretion invested in trial judges in the voir dire
process, appellate courts often defer to the trial judge's determination,
leading to the possibility of further injustice caused by failure to disclose
bad-juror lists. In Redd v. State, for example, the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals affirmed the trial judge's decision refusing to allow defense
counsel to question prospective jurors about their voting records because
some "limitation on voir dire is necessary or many trials would never
end." 2 5 9 In Bolden v. State, the court again refused to overturn the trial
judge's decision to prohibit the attorneys from asking prospective jurors
about their previous verdicts even though this information was in the
prosecutor's possession. 260 Clearly, defendants often do not have rea-
sonable access to the information contained in the prosecutor's bad-juror
lists. Failure to disclose this information should therefore constitute a
sufficient finding of injustice to overcome the work-product doctrine.
Moreover, the case law addressing the discoverability of records
that the police have supplied to the prosecution provides a useful anal-
ogy. In holding that these records are discoverable, courts have ruled
that the doctrine of fundamental fairness requires that the defendant be
afforded equal access. 261 Courts have even cited this principle where the
records in the prosecution's possession were not comprised entirely of
information that the prosecution had obtained from the police.2 6 2 The
rationale behind this rule is that, because defendants often lack the funds
to hire investigators of their own, it is only fair that they have access to
the information that the police department provides to the prosecutor. 263
Thus, some appellate courts, like those in California, Colorado, and
258 See, e.g., id. (describing a case in which a trial judge exercised his discretion to pre-
vent the attorney from questioning the jurors on voir dire about their previous voting records);
see also Redd, 578 S.W.2d at 130-31 (upholding for efficiency reasons a trial court's refusal
to allow attorneys to question jurors about their prior voting records).
259 578 S.W.2d at 130-31 (stating that the trial judge has the right to determine that a
certain question is impermissible, and that the standard for reviewing a trial judge's discretion-
ary decisions is abuse of discretion).
260 634 S.W.2d at 712.
261 See, e.g., People v. Aldridge, 209 N.W.2d 796, 797-801 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (indi-
cating that the prosecutor has the responsibility to ensure that justice is served and noting the
importance of fairness to attainment of justice).
262 See, e.g., id. (stating that it is the prosecution's responsibility to ensure that fairness
pervades the criminal-justice system). In Aldridge, the court explained that fairness is
achieved only when a defendant has the opportunity to exercise his peremptory challenges and
challenges for cause intelligently. Id. at 801 -02.
263 See People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446, 465 (Cal. 1981) ("When courts . . . deny
defendants who cannot afford similar investigations access to the prosecutor's records, the
result is that prosecutors in case after case will have substantially more information concerning
prospective jurors than do defense counsel.").
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Michigan, have attempted to end the pattern of inequality in the criminal-
justice system, which would result without disclosure of bad-juror lists.
Although the actual inequality or unfairness that results when the
defendant does not have access to the prosecution's jury dossiers is diffi-
cult to prove, some courts have found that the pattern of inequality that
could result is strong enough to compel disclosure. 2 6 4 Obviously, some
prosecutors believe that there is an advantage to using these lists; other-
wise, the use of the lists would not be as prevalent as it is today. As
previously noted, in order for an appellate court to reverse a trial judge's
determination, the trial judge's decision must have injured the defendant
in a demonstrable way. 2 6 5 But the harm need not be demonstrated in the
first instance-i.e., when the trial judge, within his or her discretion, de-
cides to compel discovery of the jury list.266 Therefore, due to the high
burden of proving actual harm from a resulting jury and the clear indica-
tion that prosecutors see a benefit in relying on bad-juror lists, trial
judges should allow discovery of such lists to ensure that the defendant
gains the same benefit as the prosecution.
Some courts, however, ignore the rationale that allowing prosecu-
tors to shield bad-juror lists from defendants creates an inequality in the
voir dire process that may further affect the composition of the jury.
Their reasoning that it is appropriate to refuse to disclose bad-juror lists
on the ground that defense attorneys are entitled to compile similar
lists267 is flawed. Prosecutors, unlike defense attorneys, represent the
people; justice and truth-seeking, and not securing a conviction, should
be their primary goal.2 68 Because of their role in the criminal-justice
system, prosecutors should not create obstacles to justice; their refusal to
264 See, e.g., id.
265 See supra Part I.C.2 (noting that, while several courts have applied a lenient approach
to the discoverability of jury dossiers, few have actually reversed a trial courts' decision to not
allow discovery).
266 See, e.g., Murtishaw, 631 P.2d at 465 (holding that, although the error in the case was
not reversible, fundamental fairness necessitates that trial judges be granted discretion to com-
pel discovery of jury dossiers).
267 See, e.g., Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274, 280 (9th Cir. 1958) (noting that
defense attorneys, although perhaps not as enthusiastically, will discuss prospective jurors with
each other and arguing that, were those discussions documented, the records would not be
turned over to the prosecution).
268 See People v. Aldridge, 209 N.W.2d 796, 799 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (noting the im-
portance of giving the defendant equal access to the material in the prosecution's possession
and stating that fundamental fairness dictates no less because prosecutors, as representatives of
the people, must strive to achieve both fairness and justice). I am reminded of the famous
statement by Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.: "It must be our purpose in government . . . to insure that
the department over which I preside is more than a Department of Prosecution and is, in fact,
the Department of Justice." Robert F. Kennedy, U.S. Attorney General, Address to the Crimi-
nal Law Section of the American Bar Association (Aug. 10, 1964).
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disclose bad-juror lists is fundamentally unfair for this reason. 2 6 9 When
prosecutors maintain bad-juror lists and use these lists in the voir dire
process, the doctrine of fundamental fairness requires that these lists be
disclosed to defense counsel.
B. To Not Grant Defense Counsel Access to Bad-Juror Lists Violates
Every Citizen's Constitutional Right to Serve on a Jury
The importance of the voir dire process to the perception of fairness
should ensure that bad-juror lists are disclosed to defense counsel when
prosecutors actually use them to conduct voir dire. Courts have held
that, where a prosecutor uses a bad-juror list to refresh his or her memory
either before or during a Batson hearing, the list must be disclosed to the
defense. 2 7 0 The rationale for this categorical rule is that, when a prose-
cutor admits to using these lists to exercise challenges during voir dire,
fundamental fairness requires that the lists be disclosed to protect against
unconstitutional uses.271 Analogously, when a prosecutor actually uses
bad-juror lists to exercise peremptory challenges, the desire to ensure
that prosecutors are "playing fair" should be even stronger. Failure to
disclose these lists contravenes not only fundamental fairness, but also an
individual juror's right to serve on a jury, because without the lists a
prosecutor's discriminatory intent would be difficult to detect.
Although Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny have used the three-
step test to avoid equal protection violations, the courts have not done
enough to protect individual jurors' constitutional right to serve on a
jury. As long as an attorney can fashion a "facially neutral" intent for
striking a juror, a peremptory strike is permissible under the Batson doc-
trine.2 7 2 Requiring a facially neutral reason for a peremptory strike thus
does not create a substantial obstacle to attorneys' explicit or implicit
biases. 2 7 3 Bad-juror lists, however, which may include explicit biases
269 See Aldridge, 209 N.W.2d at 799 ('"The State has no interest in interposing any obsta-
cle to the disclosure of the facts, unless it is interested in convicting accused parties on the
testimony of untrustworthy persons.'") (quoting People v. Davis, 18 N.W. 362, 363 (Mich.
1884)).
270 See, e.g., Franklin v. State, 12 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (reversing convic-
tion for the lower court to perform a harm analysis).
271 See, e.g., Salazar v. State, 795 S.W.2d 187, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (agreeing
with the defendant that forcing the state to produce its bad-juror list was "both necessary and
proper").
272 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see also Anna Roberts,
(Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. Riev. 827
(2012) (arguing that Batson does not account for the true intent behind peremptory strikes of
jurors by attorneys who are "of a mind to discriminate").
273 See Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire
by Questionnaire and the "Blind" Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1006 (1996)
(arguing that Batson's test cannot account for attorneys who discriminate unconsciously);
Roberts, supra note 272, at 842, 844 (explaining that Batson's requirement for a facially neu-
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against various mutable and immutable and characteristics, are not ac-
counted for by the Batson analysis. Therefore, when bad-juror lists are
not disclosed to defense counsel, individual jurors' right to serve on a
jury may be violated. The current Batson framework does not provide a
sufficient vehicle to avoid discrimination since it cannot account for an
attorney's intent to discriminate. 274 Such discriminatory intent, however,
may be discovered through the disclosure of bad-juror lists.
In Texas, there is speculation that the Tarrant County District Attor-
ney's Office uses its bad-juror list to strike jurors whom prosecutors be-
lieve are opposed to the death penalty. 2 7 5  The Batson framework
currently does not account for the possibility of exercising peremptory
challenges to strike jurors on the basis of their political views. However,
such an extension may be necessary to protect a citizen's right to serve
on a jury. 2 7 6 Although the Supreme Court's holding in Batson involved
the systematic exclusion of jurors on the basis of race, the Court has
applied similar reasoning to other forms of discrimination based on per-
sonal characteristics of potential jurors.2 7 7 Moreover, the Court's more
recent decisions regarding discriminatory peremptory challenges have
emphasized that the totality-of-the-circumstances approach must be used
whenever such challenges are questioned. 2 7 8 According to the Court in
tral reason for a peremptory challenge does not account for an attorney's various implicit
biases).
274 See Franklin v. State, 986 S.W.2d 349, 355 (Tex. App. 1999) (stating that precedent
suggests that a prosecutor must disclose any information he or she has on prospective jurors
when peremptory-challenge strikes are questioned during a Batson hearing and the prosecutor
uses the information to refresh his or her memory), rev'd on other grounds, 12 S.W.3d 473
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
275 See Trainor, supra note I (speculating as to what questions prosecutors asked jurors
that resulted in jurors' names being added to the Tarrant County bad-juror list and wondering
whether "they claim[ed] during jury selection that they could consider the death penalty as a
possible punishment-but when it came right down to it, flatly refused to do so.").
276 Although the Tarrant County prosecutors have not admitted to using the list for this
purpose, see id., an overview of Texas's historic use of capital punishment lends credence to
the speculation. Since 1976, Texas has executed 481 people, see Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
Fact Sheet, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 16,
2012), and of the 140 death row inmates who have been exonerated since then, twelve were
convicted in Texas, see The Innocence List, DEATH PENAUY INFO. CTR., http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row (last visited Apr. 16, 2012). A recent
study states that only "[a] few counties in the United States continue to sentence people to
death with any regularity." Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its
Ramifications, 92 B.U. L. REv. 227, 227 (2012). Tarrant County, Texas is one of them. See
id. at 232, 238, 239, 281.
277 See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that the use
of peremptory challenges to discriminate on the basis of gender violates the Equal Protection
Clause); Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 222-23 (1946) (holding that the systematic exclu-
sion of jurors who earn a daily wage cannot be justified under either federal or state law).
278 See, e.g., Miller-El II, 545 U.S. 231, 266 (2005) (finding that, after surveying the
circumstances surrounding the voir dire questioning and peremptory challenges, the exclusion
of black jurors did not correlate with any factor other than the person's race).
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Miller-El 1I, the approach must take into account the history of discrimi-
nation in the specific jurisdiction. 279 Given the number of people sen-
tenced to death in Texas, there may well be a pattern of exclusion of
Texas jurors based on opposition to the death penalty.280 Furthermore, a
general history of discrimination on the basis of political beliefs has ex-
isted in this country at different times, as the court in J.E.B. discussed
with regard to gender discrimination. 2 8 1 During the Cold War era, mem-
bers of the Communist and Socialist parties were excluded from various
types of employment.282 Political discrimination also occurred in the
1960s when state legislatures enacted laws that limited the ability of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to assist in
litigation aimed at ending racial discrimination. 283 Even if the history of
discrimination against political opposition to the death penalty is not evi-
dent, therefore, the general history of discrimination on the basis of polit-
ical affiliation supports extending the Batson analysis to political
discrimination.
The rationale for the expanded group of characteristics that the pros-
ecution should be barred from citing as a basis for exercising its peremp-
tory challenges is that the systematic exclusion of certain types of people
from jury service does violence to the justice system by detracting from
the democratic nature of the jury system. 284 Similarly, courts should rule
that excluding jurors on the basis of their political views-such as their
stance on the death penalty-detracts from the public's perception of the
justice system. It has long been understood that the mere appearance of
fairness is as important as ensuring that the system actually operates in a
just manner.285 However, there has been recent criticism of the justice
system in light of the exoneration of many individuals who had been
279 See id. at 236 (considering the history of the Dallas County District Attorney's dis-
crimination against black potential jurors when determining whether the prosecutor's nondis-
criminatory justifications were valid).
280 See supra note 276 (noting that Texas has had many death-penalty convictions
overturned).
281 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 130-37.
282 See, e.g., Beilan v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., Sch. Dist. of Phila., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (af
firming the removal of a public school teacher who refused to answer whether he was affili-
ated with the Communist Party).
283 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-31 (1963) (indicating that, while not a
conventional political party, the NAACP's basic function is to promote political and policy
goals).
284 See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 222 (1946) (stating that the systematic exclu-
sion of a substantial portion of potential jurors based on a discriminatory intent would harm
the trial process).
285 See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 161 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Wise observers have long
understood that the appearance of justice is as important as its reality. If the system of per-
emptory strikes affects the actual impartiality of the jury not a bit, but gives litigants a greater
belief in that impartiality, it serves a most important function.").
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sentenced to death row. 2 86 Striking jurors on the basis of their views on
the death penalty will only add to this criticism and augment the sense of
unfairness that many members of the public already associate with the
criminal-justice system. Courts should therefore extend Batson to hold
that excluding jurors on the basis of their political views-specifically
their views on capital punishment-is unconstitutional.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
The marked differences among state open-records acts28 7 and the
variation in states' willingness to disclose work-product upon a showing
of fundamental unfairness have led to inconsistency in judicial treatment
of bad-juror lists.288 Whether due to a lack of legislative history or an
unwillingness to engage in comprehensive statutory analysis, some states
have interpreted these statutes to deny defense counsel access to bad-
juror lists by holding that the exception for records that could interfere
with law-enforcement proceedings should govern. 289 Furthermore, even
where a state's open-records act does not contain such an exemption,
some states have refused to disclose the prosecution's bad-juror list be-
cause the defendant failed to make a sufficient showing that injustice
would result were he or she denied access to the list.290 By contrast,
some courts have recognized that fundamental unfairness results when
defendants are denied access to the prosecution's records and have ruled
that, where defense counsel does not have the resources to conduct a
similar investigation, the prosecution's jury dossier must be disclosed. 29 1
To resolve this inconsistency, states should amend their open-
records acts to emulate FOIA. In addition, courts should rule that, where
a prosecutor uses a bad-juror list to exercise peremptory challenges dur-
ing voir dire, there is a presumption that the prosecutor is using the list
for unconstitutionally discriminatory purposes. Fundamental fairness
286 See, e.g., Innocence List, supra note 276 (indicating that, since 1973, 138 people have
been released from death row due to newly discovered evidence of their innocence).
287 Compare TEx. Gov'r CoMn ANN. § 552.001(a) (West 2011) (listing several excep-
tions for records compiled for law-enforcement purposes), with ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (2011)
(neglecting to include an exception for public records compiled for law-enforcement needs).
288 Compare People v. Aldridge, 209 N.W.2d 796, 797 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (emphasiz-
ing the importance of ensuring that the defendant has access to sufficient information from
which to exercise his or her challenges intelligently), with Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d
274, 280-81 (9th Cir. 1958) (rejecting the argument that the doctrine of fundamental fairness
requires prosecutors to disclose their jury records to defense counsel).
289 See Tex. Att'y Gen., Open Records Decision No. 369 (Apr. 8, 1983), available at
https://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/openrecords/47mattox/ord/1 983/pdf/ord 19830369.pdf.
290 See, e.g., Hamer, 259 F.2d at 280-81.
291 See, e.g., Aldridge, 209 N.W.2d at 801; see also People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446,
465 (Cal. 1981) ("When courts ... deny defendants who cannot afford similar investigations
access to the prosecutor's records, the result is that prosecutors in case after case will have
substantially more information concerning prospective jurors than do defense counsel.").
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should dictate that the list be disclosed to the defendant. Further, if de-
fense counsel can demonstrate that the prosecution is using the list to
strike jurors who are opposed to capital punishment, the prosecutor
should be compelled to offer an altemate-and politically neutral-rea-
son for the strike.
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors sometimes use "bad juror" lists to exclude particular
citizens from jury service. Not only does this practice interfere with an
open and fair jury-selection process, thus implicating a defendant's right
to be tried by a jury of his or her peers, but it also violates potential
jurors' rights to serve in this important capacity. But who is on these
lists? And is a prosecutor required to disclose the lists themselves?
The ambiguity of states' open-records laws, coupled with the judi-
cial discretion regarding the level of injustice a defendant must establish
to overcome the work-product doctrine, has led to inconsistency in the
disclosure of prosecutors' bad-juror lists. Although the legislative intent
behind most state open-records acts follows that of the federal Freedom
of Information Act in promoting government transparency, the discretion
used by some states to enact numerous exemptions to disclosure and in-
terpret those exemptions broadly contravenes this purpose and thus di-
lutes public access to information. 2 9 2 Texas's deviation from the narrow
construction that other states-such as Georgia, Alabama, and Colo-
rado-have given to exemptions clearly disfavors disclosure of informa-
tion in prosecutorial matters and conflicts with this purpose of public
openness. While this disparity can partially be explained by the selective
interpretation of available precedent in Texas, the statute's ambiguity
lends itself to this manipulation. A better approach is for states to model
their open-records acts on FOIA to maintain consistency and to preserve
the public interest in the freedom of information.
Moreover, states are often too strict in their adherence to the work-
product doctrine to shield bad-juror lists from defense counsel. Courts
have held that prosecutors' jury dossiers should be disclosed to defense
counsel when the defendant has made a sufficient showing of necessity
or injustice.293 The magnitude of discretion invested with the trial judge,
however, makes it difficult to find reversible error solely on the basis of
the judge's failure to accept a defendant's fundamental-faimess argument
to disclose the bad-juror list. In addition, courts have typically mandated
292 See OKILA. STAr. ANN. tit. 51, § 24A.I (West 2011) (indicating the importance of
keeping the public well informed); Tix. Gov"r CoiD ANN. § 552.001(a) (West 2011) (noting
that the exceptions contained in the Texas Open Records Act were meant to be interpreted
liberally).
293 See, e.g., Couser v. State, 383 A.2d 389, 396 (Md. 1978).
512012]
52 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
disclosure of these records only when the police department compiled the
records or when the prosecutor used the records to refresh his or her
memory in relation to a Batson v. Kentucky hearing. 294 Defendants de-
serve the same treatment when the prosecution compiles its own bad-
juror list and subsequently uses the list during the voir dire process.
Further, courts should rule that there is a presumption in favor of
public disclosure of prosecutors' bad-juror lists when the prosecutor uses
these lists to aid in exercising peremptory challenges during the voir dire
process. It is fundamentally unfair for defense counsel to be denied ac-
cess to this information where the defendant lacks the resources to obtain
the same information. To disclose these lists to defense counsel would
allow the defendant the same opportunity as the prosecutor to exercise
peremptory challenges intelligently. Requiring disclosure of these lists
to the defense would also enable the defendant to more appropriately
assert Batson challenges when it appears that the prosecutor is striking
jurors for unconstitutional reasons.
The judicial system in the United States is adversarial. Particularly
in criminal cases, when prosecutors, who already hold enormous
power,2 9 5 are permitted to put their thumbs on the scale of justice during
jury selection, the entire system suffers-the rights of potential jurors,
the rights of the defendant, the integrity of the outcome of the proceed-
ings, and the appearance of justice.
294 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (indicating that it was a state actor
who was exercising peremptory challenges in an unconstitutional manner in holding that race
is an impermissible reason on which to base a challenge).
295 See generally ANGELA J. DAVIs, Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prose-
cutor (2007).
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